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ABSTRACT 
 
Movement Restriction Implications on Potential Welfare Slaughter 
For Texas High Plains Feedlots. (December 2011) 
Monica Ester Galli, B.S., California State University, Chico 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Bruce A. McCarl 
Dr. David Bessler 
 
Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is regarded as one of the greatest biological threats to the 
U.S. livestock industry because of its potential to cause catastrophic economic damages 
and massive livestock depopulation.  Current U.S. contingency plans call for “stamping 
out” of FMD.  An integral component of a “stamping out” policy is movement 
restrictions.  The main purpose for movement restrictions is to stop the spread of disease, 
but they also disrupt the agribusiness sector.  Welfare slaughter, the depopulation of 
healthy quarantined animals, is a possibility if movement restrictions are kept in place 
for prolonged periods of time.  Many studies have analyzed the economic consequences 
of alternative mitigation strategies, but generally these studies have ignored the costs that 
might arise because of movement restrictions affecting uninfected premises located 
within the quarantine zone.  Ultimately this study seeks to improve preparedness in the 
event of a FMD outbreak.  It does this by developing information for those formulating 
plans on the costs associated with movement restrictions regarding quarantined, 
uninfected large feedlots located in the Texas High Plains Region.   
 
 iv 
To accomplish this objective two strategies were compared: an unrestricted feed 
strategy, where feed is allowed to be brought onto uninfected premises and finished 
cattle are sold; and a welfare slaughter strategy, where feed isn’t allowed to be brought 
onto the uninfected premises so animals are depopulated.  In addition, seasonal 
differences in total costs were examined.  This study expanded on the High Plains Study 
conducted by M. Ward, L. Highfield, P. Vongseng, and M. Garner by using their 
epidemiological data combined with a cost accounting framework to estimate the total 
cost of each strategy.  This study examined direct disease management costs (indemnity 
payments, feed costs, marketing costs, surveillance costs, cleaning and disinfecting 
costs, appraisal cost, euthanasia costs, and disposal costs).  Overall, the unrestricted feed 
strategy was less expensive than the welfare slaughter strategy, costing on average $22.6 
million compared to $48.5 million, respectively.  Disease outbreak timing did impact the 
overall cost of both strategies.  The results suggest the policy makers should strongly 
consider creating movement policies that address feed supply and finished cattle 
movement for uninfected large feedlots in prolonged quarantine zones; as such policies 
appear to reduce outbreak related costs for stakeholder and the U.S. government.                     
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A foot and mouth disease (FMD) outbreak can be economically devastating to a nation, 
having large impacts on trade, tourism, food security and safety, and the livestock 
industry (Gilpen et al. 2009; Hennessy 2008).  In addition, terrorism may increase the 
likelihood of possible events (Elbakidze 2003; Pendell et al. 2007).  Research has shown 
that intentional outbreaks could be more expensive and larger than unintentional 
outbreaks (Pendell et al. 2007).  Whether a FMD outbreak is unintentional or the result 
of a deliberate introduction, it is important to develop control strategies that are scalable 
and economically practical regardless of the size or nature of the outbreak. 
 
In the event of a FMD outbreak local, state, and federal officials will work in 
conjunction to eradicate FMD.  Currently, the U.S. has a national “stamping out” or 
eradication policy for exotic, highly contagious, viral diseases (Whiting 2008). An 
integral part of a “stamping out” policy is movement restrictions combined with 
quarantine zones.  The main purpose for movement restrictions and quarantine zones is 
to stop the spread of disease, but these actions also disrupt livestock production and 
other sectors in the region, including tourism, transportation, and agribusiness.  
Theoretically, no potentially contaminated vector material, object, or living being can 
enter or exit the quarantine zone without being decontaminated.   
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of the American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
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In past FMD outbreaks movement restrictions led to overcrowding, lack of feed, and 
lack of bedding for quarantined premises (Crispin et al. 2002; Laurence 2002; 
Dijkhuizen 1999).  These conditions were not only inhumane for the affected livestock, 
but they also caused public outcry of concern for animal welfare.  Producers also 
experienced negative psychological effects, such as stress and depression (Scott, 
Christie, and Midmore 2004).  In order to prevent the furtherance of such adverse 
consequences of movement restrictions, welfare slaughter, the depopulation of animals 
not infected with a foreign animal disease (FAD), to prevent suffering, became the 
solution to the animal welfare issues. 
 
During the 1997 outbreak of classical swine fever (CSF) in the Netherlands, 9.2 million 
hogs were slaughtered for welfare reasons (Burrell 2002).  During the 2001 FMD 
outbreak in the U.K., which lasted from February to November, movement restriction 
and quarantine zones caused welfare slaughter, with approximately 2.05 million animals 
slaughtered for welfare slaughter reasons, plus an additional 525,000 lambs slaughtered 
because of loss of market access; a total of 2.58 million animals were depopulated by 
means of welfare slaughter in the 2001 U.K. FMD outbreak which accounted for 
approximately 38 percent of all depopulated animals (NAO 2002).    
 
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS) has developed contingency plans for certain FADs and 
premises types which outline the procedures that will be taken in the event of a disease 
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outbreak.  Welfare slaughter concerns is an area that could merit attention as movement 
restrictions and quarantine zones pose a threat to the health of the livestock industry, and 
development of  contingency plans might facilitate continuity of business if a FMD 
outbreak occurs. 
 
1.1 Thesis Objectives 
The ultimate objective of this thesis is to improve preparedness in the event of a FAD 
outbreak, particularly a FMD virus outbreak. More specifically this project aims to add 
to the existing literature by analyzing the economic costs associated with animal welfare 
and movement restriction policies for uninfected quarantined large feedlots.  To 
accomplish the objective, this study utilizes simulated data from a previous Texas High 
Plains study (Ward et al. 2009) and focuses on movement restrictions regarding 
uninfected large feedlots located within a quarantine zone in a case study outbreak.  A 
FMD outbreak originating in that region could be particularly disastrous because of the 
size and scope of the cattle industry. In particular the region is dominated by cattle 
production and characterized by a large number of varying sized confined livestock 
feeding operations, otherwise known as feedlots. 
 
The study will analyze the cost differences between two scenarios for uninfected, 
quarantined large feedlots in the Texas High Plains Region (THPR):  
 an unrestricted feed situation and  
 a welfare slaughter situation.   
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The unrestricted feed situation allows unrestricted feed delivery and marketing of 
finished cattle from uninfected premises, while the welfare slaughter situation minimizes 
movement and reduces risk by feeding cattle a subsistence ration, presumably using on-
site feed ingredients, and euthanizing uninfected herds as on-site feed no longer is 
available.  
 
1.2 Motivation  
The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 highlighted the need for multiagency 
response plans that deal with terrorism and emergency situations.  Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) (2003) and HSPD-9 (2004) both highlighted that the 
infrastructure supporting the U.S. agriculture industry is vulnerable to terrorist attacks.  
In the event of a terrorist attack or other disaster, the continued operation of the 
agriculture industry is vital to the country’s survival.   
 
HSPD-9 (2004) recognized that the pre-harvest livestock industry is vulnerable to FAD 
because of the scale of livestock production, international trade and travel, and 
bioterrorism (Western Institute for Food Safety and Security 2009).  FMD is considered 
to be the most contagious disease in cloven-hoofed livestock and, as such, it is the 
greatest FAD threat faced by U.S. livestock producers (USDA, APHIS 2007a).  The fact 
that FMD is highly contagious and its introduction could cripple many U.S. high value 
and high output livestock operations also makes it an appealing bioterrorism agent. 
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The U.S. livestock industry is highly specialized.  Livestock rarely live out their entire 
lives on one premises.  For example, it is standard practice in the cattle industry to send 
feeder cattle from cow-calf operations to stocker operations then on to feedlots (USDA, 
ERS 2009).  Cattle may be moved three or even four times in their life from birth to 
slaughter.  A study of two concentrated feeding areas in Texas and Kansas found that 80 
percent of all feeder cattle are shipped into the area from more than 200 miles away 
(Shields and Mathews 2003; Bailey, Brorsen, and Thomsen 1995).  In addition, the trend 
in some aspects of livestock production is toward larger, more concentrated facilities; 
80-90 percent of all marketed beef cattle are finished in feedlots with at least 1,000 head 
of cattle (USDA, ERS 2009).  Although it is important to note that many cow calf herds 
remain small with the average herd having 40 head, hence movement is an integral part 
of the system (USDA, ERS 2009).  Calves from smaller cow calf herds are routinely 
sold to increasingly larger operations throughout the finishing stages, so movement is an 
integral part of the beef cattle industry.  One study showed that on average meat travels 
994 miles from farm to fork (Cupp, Walker, and Hillison 2004). 
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2. OVERVIEW OF TEXAS HIGH PLAINS REGION, FMD, PAST OUTBREAKS, 
AND CURRENT USDA POLICIES 
2.1 Cattle Industry  
The cattle industry is a highly segmented industry, with producers usually specializing in 
a single stage of production.  The four main segments of the cattle industry are cow-calf, 
stocker, feedlots, and packers.  Typically, each segment sells to the next in line.  Cow-
calf producers raise calves to weaning, typically until calves are six or seven months old 
and around 600 pounds.  Stocker operations purchase weaned calves and feed them, 
usually on pasture, for further weight gain.  Feedlots purchase calves or stocker calves 
and finish them for harvest.  Packers purchase the finished cattle from feedlots and 
process the cattle into wholesale cuts of beef, which then continue down the marketing 
stream.  The cattle industry is similar to a funnel, a lot of producers are involved in 
raising cow calf herds and their calves supply a smaller number of stocker operations or 
an even more concentrated number of feedlots and packers.  
 
This study specifically examines the quarantine costs for large uninfected feedlots.  In 
this study large feedlots are considered to be feedlots with more than 5,000 head.  
Feedlots are confined livestock feeding operations, where cattle are fed a corn based diet 
before reaching their desired harvest weight.  Movement of inputs and outputs plays an 
integral role for feedlots.  The day to day operations of feedlots require the large scale 
movement of feed, veterinary care, calves, stocker cattle, finished cattle, and human 
workers among other items.  Feedlots are able to produce a large volume of high value 
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cattle because as soon as finished cattle are marketed new stocker cattle and calves take 
their place. 
 
Seasonality, regular patterns and variations occurring within a year, strongly affect the 
cattle industry.  Seasonality is often driven by biological factors and climate, which 
result in supply fluctuations throughout the year.  For example, seasonality in cattle sales 
and movements are created mainly because the climatic seasons greatly influence the 
timing of calf weaning and stocker cattle production (Peel and Meyer 2002).  Seasonal 
prices greatly impact how feedlot producers run their feedlot and maximize profit.  
Feedlot populations have a seasonal pattern.  This study accounts for the affects of 
seasonal feedlot populations and feed costs and market value of cattle when examining 
the overall costs for quarantined large uninfected feedlots.  
 
2.2 Texas High Plains Region 
This study is specific to the THPR.  The THPR refers to an eight county area (20,570 sq. 
km) located in the Texas Panhandle.  The eight counties encompassed by the THPR are 
Bailey, Castro, Deaf Smith, Hale, Lamb, Parmer, Randall, and Swisher counties.  The 
region is dominated by cattle production and characterized by a large number of varying 
sized feedlots.  High-density livestock production is especially common in the region, 
with an estimated 1.8 million cattle on feed (Ward et al. 2009).  Other FMD susceptible 
livestock species raised in the region include dairy cattle, sheep, swine, and goats.  
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2.3 FMD Virus Background 
FMD is considered to be the most contagious disease in livestock and, as such, it is the 
greatest FAD threat U.S. livestock producers face (USDA, APHIS 2007a).  FMD is an 
economically significant disease which carries major international trade limitations 
(Kitching, et al. 2007).  The most recent FMD outbreak in the United States occurred in 
1929, although FMD outbreaks occur regularly around the world.  According to the 
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) (2011a), the intergovernmental 
organization responsible for improving animal health globally, 10 countries were 
experiencing disease events as of August 2011(Figure 1).  The majority of the countries 
experiencing disease events were located in Southern Africa, where FMD is considered 
endemic within the water buffalo population.  In fact, FMD is considered to be endemic 
in most of Asia and Africa (Kitching et al. 2007).   
 
 
 
Figure 1. Current FMD Events as of August 2011 
(OIE WAHID Interface Disease Distribution Maps 2009)  
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The OIE classifies countries based on their FMD status.  There are two ways a country 
or region without FMD can be classified; “FMD free where vaccination is not practiced” 
and “FMD free where vaccination is practiced” (OIE 2011b).  In countries classified as 
“FMD free where vaccination is practiced”, FMD is endemic in populations of cloven-
hoofed animals and has the potential to spread; these countries vaccinate against FMD to 
prevent the spread of the disease and minimize production losses.  Countries can also be 
regionalized into FMD free zones without or with vaccination practiced.  Countries and 
zones with the designation “FMD free where vaccination is not practiced” have the most 
lenient requirements for international trade of animals and animal products imposed by 
the OIE (USDA, APHIS 2008).  Countries or zones with the status “FMD free where 
vaccination is practiced” often face trade bans and restrictions that cripple their 
international market for live animals and meat exports (Junker, Komorowska, and 
Tongeren 2009).  As of May 2011, the U.S. and 64 other countries were officially 
classified as free from FMD without vaccination (OIE 2011a).  When outbreaks occur, 
nations usually try and regain the status “FMD free where vaccination is not practiced” 
as quickly as possible; this will be discussed in more detail later on in section 2.11.1  
Stamping Out and Trade Implications.    
 
The FMD virus is a highly contagious, vesicular disease affecting all cloven-hoofed 
animals, including bovine, bison, swine, sheep, goats, and deer.  As reported by USDA 
APHIS, the threat posed by a FMD outbreak is not due to the mortality rate the disease 
poses; most adult animals survive infection and the young animal death rate is 
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approximately 50% (USDA, APHIS 2007b).  Rather, it is the almost 100% morbidity 
rate, reduced meat and milk productivity, and trade implications that make the disease so 
dangerous to U.S. livestock producers (Hagerman 2009).   
 
There are seven serotypes of FMD: O, A, C, SAT 1, SAT 2, SAT 3 and Asia 1; plus 
more than 60 sub-serotypes (USDA, APHIS 2007b).   Serotype O is the most common 
and was responsible for the pan-Asia epidemic, which began in 1990 (Center for Food 
Security and Public Health 2007).  In general, only one serotype is present during a 
specific FMD outbreak, but in cases where more than serotype is infecting animals 
eradication becomes more difficult because immunity against one serotype does not 
provide cross-protection against the others, so if vaccination is used to slow the spread of 
disease then doses of each serotype vaccination would be needed (Center for Food 
Security and Public Health 2007).  For example, in 2005 serotype A outbreaks appeared 
and escalated in Iran and locally produced vaccines provided no protection against that 
serotype; as a result, serotype A outbreaks spread to Turkey and 2.5 million doses of 
emergency vaccine were provided by the European Union vaccine bank (FAO 2007).  
Once an animal is infected, the FMD virus can be spread through any secretion, 
excretion, or tissue, including the animal’s breath, milk, semen, saliva, urine, feces or 
blood.  Infected animals shed the disease for days or weeks and even after recovery can 
become carriers of the virus (USDA, APHIS 2007b).  Cattle can typically shed the 
disease for 8 to 11 days (Center for Food Security and Public Health 2007).  Hogs shed 
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the greatest amount of virus, but cattle appear to have the greatest morbidity (Ekboir 
1999).   
 
Direct contact is not the only way the disease can spread.  Anything that comes in 
contact with the infected animal can become a carrier, including trucks, feed, clothes, 
non-susceptible species, and other fomites
1
.  The FMD virus is not considered zoonotic 
because of the mildness and rarity of human infection. The disease rarely infects 
humans, and even then it causes only mild symptoms (Bickett-Weddle et al. 2004). A 
person can carry the disease in their nose and lungs for up to 48 hours (Musser 2004) 
and could potentially spread the disease to any susceptible animal they come in contact 
with during that time period.  Under the right conditions, the disease can also become 
windborne.  Cattle are more susceptible to the airborne virus compared to other livestock 
(Ekboir 1999). 
 
Cattle that are infected with FMD undergo at least three distinct disease transition 
phases: latent, sub-clinically infectious, and a clinically infectious stage.  The latent 
stage is estimated to last an average of 3.7 days; during this stage the virus is not 
detectable and the animal is not shedding the virus (Thurmond and Perez 2006).  During 
the sub-clinically infectious stage, the animal begins to shed the virus, but does not yet 
exhibit clinical signs of the disease.  During the clinically infectious stage, the animal 
continues to shed the disease and starts to exhibit clinical signs of the disease, which 
                                                 
1
 Fomites are inanimate objects capable of carrying and spreading infectious disease.  
12 
 
include blisters in and around the mouth and feet, lameness, and excess salivation 
(USDA, APHIS 2007a).  It is important to note that the signs of FMD can vary in 
severity across animal species and FMD serotypes; in addition, symptoms of certain 
benign health problems mimic those of FMD.  For example, during the 2001 U.K. FMD 
outbreak, sheep were misdiagnosed because they were foraging on brambles and gorse 
(Crisipin et al. 2002).  While visual symptoms of FMD are a good indication of 
infection, the only way to definitively diagnose FMD is through laboratory testing. 
 
2.4 Welfare Slaughter Issues  
In past FMD outbreaks in the United Kingdom (U.K.) and classical swine fever (CSF) 
outbreaks the Netherlands, movement restrictions led to overcrowding, lack of feed, and 
lack of bedding for quarantined premises (Crispin et al. 2002; Laurence 2002; 
Dijkhuizen 1999).  These conditions were not only inhumane for the affected livestock, 
but they also caused public outcry of concern for animal welfare.  Producers also 
experienced negative psychological effects, such as stress and depression (Scott, 
Christie, and Midmore 2004).  Because quarantine zones and movement restrictions 
were kept in place to minimize the risk of disease spread, welfare slaughter became the 
solution to the animal welfare issues.  Welfare slaughter is the depopulation of healthy 
animals due to inhumane conditions or the potential for inhumane conditions caused by 
the disease eradication efforts, such as, quarantine zones and movement restrictions.  In 
past outbreaks, animals killed under welfare slaughter were treated the same as diseased 
and disease exposed animals as far as depopulation, carcass disposal, and indemnity 
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payments.  Welfare slaughter programs have been expensive and competed for the 
resources needed for disease eradication efforts (Whiting 2008; Mangen, Nielen, and 
Burrell 2002).  
 
2.4.1 2001 United Kingdom FMD Outbreak 
During the 2001 FMD outbreak in the U.K., which lasted from February to November, 
movement restriction and quarantine zones caused hardship for producers.  After the 
initial detection of the disease and halt of all movement, a permit system was set up to 
allow restricted movement for uninfected animals.  The government did not provide 
sufficient resources and, as a result, the permitting system was slow, bureaucratic, and 
inflexible (Crispin et al. 2002; Laurence 2002).  For example, producers were sometimes 
denied the opportunity to move livestock from an overgrazed pasture to a neighboring 
field with more available feed resources (FAWC 2002).   
 
Due to animal welfare issues, mainly lack of feed, government officials introduced the 
Livestock Welfare Disposal Scheme (LWDS) on March 22, 2001.  Under the LWDS, 
the U.K. government culled uninfected livestock and indemnified livestock producers.  
Although the LWDS was a voluntary program, many livestock producers subscribed, as 
the program offered generous compensation for culled animals.  In many instances, the 
indemnity payments offered by the program were higher than market values for 
livestock; thus, the LWDS was susceptible to fraud and misuse and became very 
expensive to maintain.  Over time, the U.K. government reduced indemnity payments 
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and began allowing additional movement within the control zone to reduce the costs of 
the program (FAWC 2002; NAO 2002).   
 
In addition to the LWDS, the U.K. government introduced and funded the Light Lamb 
Scheme (LLS) from September 3, 2001 until late October 2001.  The LLS was 
developed for producers who couldn’t find a market for their lambs as a result of export 
bans or in-country movement restrictions.  The scheme was designed to help producers 
recoup funds and alleviate animal welfare problems before they began.   
 
The total FMD outbreak cost to the U.K. national treasury was £2.7 billion 
(approximately $3.97 billion U.S. dollars), which included £471 million (approximately 
$696 million U.S. dollars) paid to producers for the compensation of livestock destroyed 
due to animal welfare reasons, about 18 percent of the total cost (Davies 2002).  
Approximately 2.05 million animals were slaughtered under the LWDS, plus an 
additional 525,000 lambs were slaughtered under the LLS during the FMD epidemic 
(NAO 2002).  Table 1 summarizes the reasons, numbers, and types of livestock 
slaughtered during the U.K. 2001 FMD epidemic.  
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Table 1. Livestock Slaughter Amounts for the 2001 U.K. FMD Outbreak 
  Sheep Cattle Pig 
 Number 
of Head 
Percentage of 
Total Sheep 
Slaughtered 
Number 
of Head 
Percentage of 
Total Cattle 
Slaughtered 
Number 
of Head 
Percentage of 
Total Pigs 
Slaughtered 
Slaughtered 
For: 
      
Disease 
Purposes 
3.4 
million 
61.5% 590,000 77.7% 145,000 33.6% 
Livestock 
Welfare 
Disposal 
Scheme 
1.6 
million 
29.0% 169,000 22.3% 287,000 
 
66.4% 
Light Lamb 
Scheme 
525,000 9.5%     
Total 
Slaughtered  
5.525 
million 
 759,000  432,000  
 (Crispin, Roger, O’Hare, and Binn 2002) 
 
 
The welfare slaughter schemes competed with the FMD eradication strategies for human 
resources, especially for slaughtering and disposal activities (Whiting 2008; Mangen, 
Nielen, and Burrell 2002).  The Farm Animal Welfare Council (2002), an expert 
committee on animal welfare in the U.K., recommended that in the event of future 
outbreaks, more attention and funding should be given to “welfare vouchers”, which 
could be used by producers to purchase the feed and other supplies necessary to finish 
uninfected animals, instead of focusing only on slaughter and disposal strategies.   
 
2.4.2 1997 Netherlands Classical Swine Fever Outbreak 
During the 1997 outbreak of classical swine fever (CSF) in the Netherlands, 9.2 million 
hogs were slaughtered for welfare reasons (Burrell 2002).  The main reason for welfare 
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slaughter in the Netherlands was overcrowding (Mangen, Nielen, and Burrell 2003; 
Burrell 2002).  Hog farming is divided into three main stages in the Netherlands: 
breeding, multiplication, and fatting.  Each stage is usually carried out on a different 
premises; consequently, live animal movement is vital to production.  In addition, 
producers often do not have the facilities necessary to house animals past certain 
production stages.  Within a few weeks of the movement restrictions being enforced, 
overcrowding occurred on most hog farms (Mangen, Nielen, and Burrell 2003).  
Overcrowding is problematic because it can cause stress, cannibalism, fighting, and even 
structural problems for pen floors because overweight animals can cause the floor to 
break (Mangen, Nielen, and Burrell 2003).  In 1997, the government of the Netherlands 
developed and implemented a program where hogs from overcrowded farms where 
bought, slaughtered, and rendered.  Saatkamp, Berentsen, and Horst (2000) found that 
approximately 45 percent of total eradication costs in past CSF outbreaks in the 
Netherlands and Belgium were associated with welfare slaughter.  An insemination ban 
was also issued to prevent the spread of the disease.  The European Union later stated 
that insemination bans should not be repeated because it disrupted the piglet market in 
1998 when large-scale synchronized insemination of sows at the end of the ban flooded 
the market (Mangen, Nielen, and Burrell 2003).   
 
2.4.3 Lesson from Past Outbreaks 
Both FAD outbreaks illustrate the animal welfare problems that may arise on uninfected 
premises due to movement restrictions.  In both cases, it became necessary for the 
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government to establish programs to help producers deal with movement restrictions and 
quarantine zones.  The expensive cost and large number of animals slaughtered under 
the welfare slaughter schemes also raised questions about the ethical nature of the 
programs.  In the U.K. and the Netherlands, for example, welfare slaughter animals were 
not marketed for human consumption.  Both FMD and CSF are considered non-
zoonotic. Welfare slaughter animals are not infected or directly in contact with infected 
animals, meaning animals could have been harvested for consumption or other uses.   
The U.S. could face similar challenges concerning animal welfare during an outbreak. 
Past outbreaks illustrate why it is important to understand, plan and prepare for these 
potential challenges.   
 
2.5 The Threat of FMD 
According to Texas State Veterinarian Dr. Dee Ellis, “In today’s world where people 
travel and trade so much internationally, we need to remember that the introduction of 
FMD to Texas livestock is an ongoing threat” (TAHC 2011).  The intentional release on 
FMD is a real threat.  For example, in February 2011, Brian Roach, a 64 year old South 
African man was arrested for threatening to release FMD virus in the U.S. and Britain 
(Guardian.co.uk 2011).  Many experts argue that maintaining a “stamping out” policy 
increases the threat of an intentional FMD outbreak because with minimum effort 
terrorist could cause substantial economic and psychological havoc (DeOtte Jr. 2007; 
DeOtte and DeOtte 2010).  Research has shown that intentional outbreaks could be more 
expensive and larger than unintentional outbreaks (Pendell et al. 2007).  Political 
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instability, public fear, and significant economic damages are three consequences that 
could result from an intentional animal disease outbreak (Jin, McCarl, Elbakidze 2009).  
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 Texas has increased its a priori 
planning for intentional and unintentional outbreaks of FMD (DeOtte 2007).   For 
example, Operation Palo Duro (Giovachino et al. 2007) was a multiagency table-top 
exercise that examined how an outbreak of FMD would be responded to in the Texas 
High Plains.  In addition, the Department of Homeland Security also commissioned a 
Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP) Systems Recovery Analysis (Miller 
2010) to identify gaps in existing emergency plans and to identify ideas that will 
strengthen the preparedness of the Texas cattle feeding industry in the event of a FMD 
outbreak.   
 
The results from Operation Palo Duro (Giovachino et al. 2007) and the RRAP Systems 
Recovery Analysis (Miller, 2010) provide a justification for studying quarantine 
implications for uninfected premises, specifically the idea of marketing cattle from these 
premises.  The “need to identify ways to minimize losses to producers and incentivize 
producers so they are willing to feed animals for slaughter in the affected zone” was an 
outcome idea identified during the RRAP Systems Recovery Analysis (Miller 2010) 
because of resource availability. 
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2.6 Potential Welfare Slaughter in the Event of an U.S. FMD Outbreak 
Exploring the implications of harvesting and marketing potential welfare slaughter 
livestock is an area of interest for emergency planners.  Having contingency plans that 
minimize animal welfare issues that arise under movement restitutions is critical for the 
U.S. because it could help lower the overall cost and minimize the number of animals 
slaughtered.  The U.S. livestock industry is vulnerable to the same welfare problems that 
arose in the U.K. and the Netherlands.   In fact, DeOtte and DeOtte (2010) highlighted 
the need to consider alternatives to mass depopulation and carcass disposal during an 
infectious disease outbreak because euthanizing and disposing of a large number of 
animals isn’t feasible.       
 
Livestock production in the THPR is susceptible to the same conditions that created 
animal welfare issues during the disease outbreaks in the U.K. and the Netherlands.  
Depending on the time of year and weather conditions, feed and water shortages for 
livestock in the THPR are a possibility.  Movement restrictions would put many 
operations at risk for feed shortages, especially feedlots, and possibly necessitate welfare 
slaughter.  Limited on-farm storage capacity and reliance on deliveries of inputs are two 
factors that will require planning to minimize negative animal welfare effects under 
movement restrictions.   
 
The U.S. livestock industry, particularly production in the THPR, relies heavily on 
concentrated large-scale animal feeding operations, otherwise known as feedlots.  This 
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means that moving feed onto uninfected feedlots is very time sensitive.  Large feedlots 
generally maintain approximately three to five days worth of feed on hand (Ward et al. 
2009).  Luckily, the existing structure of the U.S. livestock industry has developed an 
infrastructure with the capability to deliver feed anywhere in the country within a matter 
of days, meaning that welfare slaughter in affected areas could be avoided with proper 
planning and policies (Cleveland 2010).   
 
In the event of an FMD outbreak, overcrowding isn’t projected to be a major issue in the 
THPR because the majority of livestock are cattle housed on feedlots.  The growth rate 
of cattle is slower than hogs and feedlot pens allow for more leeway in weight gain 
before overcrowding becomes an issue.  Overcrowding could become an issue for swine 
operations located within the THPR, because all pork-processing facilities are located 
out-of-state.  Also there may be issues with dairy calf raising operations, stocker 
operations and animals in transit at time of quarantine imposition. In order for THPR 
producers to process hogs, USDA would have to develop a permitting process for 
interstate movement of hogs to areas outside of the quarantine zone. 
 
This research will assume that, based on previous litigation (Yancey v. United States), in 
the event of a FMD outbreak, the U.S. government would essentially “become the 
market” and an authorized “taking” of healthy, un-infected animals would proceed 
because movement restrictions would cause producers to lose access to markets.  The 
ruling of this case is based on the Fifth Amendment, which states that individuals must 
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be compensated when the government assumes ownership of property for the public 
good.  The logic is that by performing “takings”, the government will be better able to 
ensure animal welfare standards and maintain movement restrictions, while still 
providing compensation to livestock producers for culled animals. 
 
2.7 U.S. FMD Prevention Policies and Programs 
Currently, resources are employed to prevent the introduction of FMD into the U.S.  
Strict trade policies ensure that possible contaminated materials aren’t imported from 
infected countries.  For example, regions of Argentina, Brazil, and Columbia either are 
not permitted to export meat products or are only permitted to export canned beef 
products to the U.S. (USDA, Food Safety and Inspection Service 2011).  The magnitude 
of international trade restrictions have been shown to have implications on the disease 
eradication method chosen (Paarlberg, Lee and Seitzinger 2002).  Because of negative 
trade consequences, many countries will take a more aggressive approach to eradicate 
disease.  In addition, people returning from visiting infected countries are questioned by 
customs agents and precautions like shoe baths are taken if they have visited a farm or 
have been in contact with livestock while abroad (USDA, APHIS 2003).  USDA APHIS 
also works in conjunction with governmental agencies in countries experiencing FMD 
outbreaks. USDA APHIS provides monetary and resource support to help countries 
regain and maintain FMD-free status (USDA, APHIS 2003).  During the 2001 U.K. 
FMD outbreak, American veterinarians assisted in the surveillance, diagnosing, testing, 
and euthanasia of livestock (Cleveland 2010).  
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2.8 Ex Ante Spending on Planning, Preparedness, and Response 
Ex ante governmental spending on planning, preparedness, and response capabilities for 
emergencies increased after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  The 
Bioterrorism Act of 2002, 2002 Farm Bill, HSPD-7, and HSPD-9 all provided funding 
and legislation which allowed for ex ante spending to protect U.S. agriculture (Gilpen et 
al. 2009).  As a result, USDA APHIS has expanded over the past decade, adding new 
programs to address emergency management and FMD outbreaks.   
 
USDA APHIS and many state agencies have contingency plans that outline certain 
procedures and chains of command during an FMD outbreak.  Most of these plans are 
based on highly uncertain information, making constant revision and critiquing 
necessary to refine policies and programs.  In addition, USDA APHIS is currently 
working on updating the Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan, the 
last version was released in 2003. Leaders in the THPR have recognized the need to 
modify and adapt the existing Texas State plan, Foreign and Emerging Animal Disease 
Response Plan (2004), to realistically deal with the needs of the THPR in a FMD 
outbreak (DeOtte 2007).  In February 2007 the Texas Animal Health Commission 
(TAHC) and USDA APHIS jointly held a table-top exercise, known as Operation Palo 
Duro, to facilitate multiagency training in a hypothetical unintentional FMD outbreak 
exercise.  Operation Palo Duro highlighted the fact that there are many logistical issues 
associated with a “stamping out” policy and specifics on how to deal with different 
possible scenarios are still unaddressed in this region.  
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To bolster national response capabilities the USDA APHIS developed the National 
Response Management Team (NRMT) which is a group of individuals who are 
considered specialists in incident management and have the ability to provided 
leadership in the event of an agricultural emergency.  The NRMT also facilitated the 
USDA APHIS incorporation into the National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
and Incident Command System (ICS), which are multiagency systems that allow for the 
flexibility to contract and expand response actions depending on the emergency.  The 
goal of ex ante spending directed towards FMD is to allow for quicker response which 
ideally will lead to decreased spread and quicker eradication.  The NIMS and ICS may 
be beneficial for uninfected premises by expediting the permitting process for quarantine 
zones. 
 
An assessment of U.S. agricultural vulnerabilities emphasizes the fact that, in the event 
of an FMD outbreak, agricultural veterinary personnel would be limited.  The U.S. 
National Animal Health Emergency Response Corps (USNAHERC), was created in 
2001, and is a roster of agricultural veterinary professional volunteers who can be 
mobilized quickly by USDA APHIS.  Per Diem (food and lodging costs) and travel costs 
are paid for by USDA APHIS (Hennessy 2008).  The USNAHERC will be available to 
help with surveillance, diagnosis, and testing on uninfected premises.  Having the 
USNAHER established and funded is a good foundation in ensuring resources during 
times of emergency.     
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The National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) was developed under the HSPD-9 to 
coordinate and provided veterinary resources (supplies, equipment, field tests, vaccines, 
and support staff) to states experiencing animal disease outbreaks which have exhausted 
the state’s resources.  The NVS became operational in 2006 and is designed to be able to 
deploy countermeasures to states within 24 hours.  The NVS has resources strategically 
located and works in conjunction with states on designing the logistics of emergency 
response plans.  For example, the NVS has personal protective equipment stocked and 
ready for deployment and contracts in place with suppliers. 
 
Animal tracing capabilities are an important component in getting ahead of disease 
spread.  USDA APHIS tried to launch the National Animal Identification System 
(NAIS) to address animal tracing capabilities in the event of a disease outbreak.  NAIS 
was designed with the long term goal of identifying all direct contact herds and premises 
within 48 hours of disease diagnosis (USDA, APHIS 2010a).  NAIS was very 
controversial and the majority of industry stakeholders were strongly opposed to NAIS, 
citing increased costs and too much government intervention.  As a result of lobbying, 
NAIS went from being mandatory to voluntary.  NAIS was largely seen as unsuccessful, 
with over $120 million invested and only 36 percent participation (USDA, APHIS 
2010a).  In February 2010 USDA APHIS closed the NAIS program and has begun the 
initial steps for implementing the new Animal Disease Traceability (ADT) program.  
ADT is designed to be state and tribal run mandatory programs and will only focus on 
premises that transport animals interstate (USDA, APHIS 2010a). 
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2.9 Transport Plans for Uninfected Premises  
Continuity of business is important for business survival.  Allowing safe movement of 
certain agricultural commodities, products, and services in and out of a control area is 
necessary for business survival and animal welfare.  Many agricultural industries operate 
on a “just-in-time” basis.  For example, dairies and commercial egg production relay on 
daily transport of inputs and outputs.  Commonly, commercial egg production facilities 
have maximum storage capacity limited to the number of eggs that can be produced in a 
48 hours time period (Trampel et al. 2009).  To help facilitate movement during animal 
disease movement restrictions and quarantine zones USDA APHIS has begun to develop 
transport plans for movement of products from premises located within control areas.  
The goals of these plans are to ensure business continuity, protect export markets, and to 
minimize the chance of disease spread though movement.  Similar plans need to be 
developed for livestock producers, especially in areas with highly concentrated animal 
production.  This research aims to provide the economic justification for developing 
such plans. 
 
2.9.1 FAST Egg Plan 
The overall goal of the FAST Egg Plan is to facilitate business continuity and economic 
survival of participating uninfected premises, plus ensure the egg and egg product supply 
for consumers (Trampel et al. 2009).  The FAST Eggs Plan is a voluntary plan 
developed for commercial table egg producers.  It was created by USDA APHIS and 
Iowa State faculty and designed to allow for movement of eggs and egg products from 
26 
 
uninfected premises within a high pathogen avian influenza control area.  The FAST 
Egg Plan is based on five main components that incorporate biosecurity, testing 
requirements, and permits.  Once a premises is registered, premises data will be stored in 
a state’s databases and will be accessible to authorized individuals only.  When an 
outbreak occurs quarantine boundaries and disease spread information is updated in real-
time.  It is the responsibility of the producer to release their premises-specific 
information within the system in order to request permits for movement.  Ex Ante 
investment in plans and systems such as this will benefit both producers and consumers.    
 
2.9.2 Secure Milk Supply  
USDA APHIS has also begun work on creating a transportation plan for dairies called 
the Secure Milk Supply (SMS) Plan in the event of a FMD outbreak.  USDA APHIS 
recognizes that “just-in-time” supply practices on dairies could result in significant milk 
disposal and animal welfare issues during times of movement restrictions.  Dairies are 
dependent on milk tankers to haul their milk to processing plants and they have limited 
storage capacity.  Most dairy operations have enough storage capacity for the amount of 
milk produced during a 48 hour time period; but some have a more limited storage 
capacity limited to the production from a 24 hour time period (USDA, APHIS 2010b).  
The overall goal of the SMS Plan is to develop accepted practices that can form a FAST 
plan for movement of milk and dairy products from dairies and milk processing facilities 
located within a FMD control area in order to ensure continuity of business and the 
availability of milk and dairy products for consumers.  The SMS Plan is in its infancy, 
27 
 
currently, working groups have formed to collect information and develop process and 
procedures that all stakeholders can agree are feasible and will facilitate safe movement 
of milk without increasing the risk of FMD spread or impairing the ability to export US 
agricultural products. 
 
2.10 Initial Response 
In the early stages of an outbreak, before laboratory test confirmation, the initial 
responding agency would be the state and local officials.  In the case of an FMD 
outbreak in the THPR the TAHC would be first responder.  A foreign animal disease 
diagnostician (FADD) will immediately be deployed to the suspected infected premises 
to collect epidemiological samples and review records.  Based on expert opinion, clinical 
signs, and history the FADD will classify the likelihood of infection as “unlikely,” 
“possible,” or “highly likely” until lab test results are able to prove or disprove the 
presence of the FMD virus (USDA, APHIS 2008).  When a suspect case of FMD occurs 
in the THPR epidemiological samples would be shipped to the USDA APHIS Plum 
Island Research Facility.   
 
Before receiving the test results, which usually occurs within a 24 hour time period but 
could take as long as 48 hours, the FADD will use their best judgment to establish 
temporary quarantine zones.  After receiving a confirmed positive test result, an initial 
minimum 48-hour ban on the movement of all susceptible livestock and related 
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industries will be enforced, most likely on the entire Southwestern U.S. Region 
(Cleveland 2010).   
 
The size of the movement ban will be established by USDA APHIS and can vary in size 
depending on a number of factors; such as number of infected animals detected, how 
long the animals have been located on the premises, the origins of infected animals, and 
even weather conditions.  It is estimated that the initial stop movement ban will last 48 
hours, but it may be enforced for a longer period of time.  The initial strict movement 
ban has multiple purposes and will be enforced until those purposes are accomplished.  
The top priority is to research the infected premises and animals in order to estimate the 
amount of direct and indirect contact and the scope of the outbreak.  The initial 
movement ban may also allow enough time for other infected animals to express clinical 
signs and be identified as well as time for the movement of resources into the infected 
region to execute the eradication plan.  Finally, the initial complete movement ban 
allows officials and scientists to set what they deem appropriate quarantine zones and 
movement restrictions.  Overall, the initial movement ban allows for multiagency 
response coordination and planning that is based on scientific studies, expert opinion, 
local geographical knowledge, and ex ante preparation.  APHIS would join the TAHC in 
setting up a unified command post, where people representing all jurisdiction would 
collectively work together to stop the spread of FMD.  As stated earlier, USDA APHIS 
FMD guidelines call for a “stamping out” policy and a series of response zones and 
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movement restrictions in order to eradicate and contain an FMD outbreak once a positive 
test result is received.   
 
During the Operation Palo Duro Exercise (2007) stakeholders brought up the concern of 
livestock in transit during the announcement of the initial movement ban.  In that 
exercise it was assumed that animals in transit to slaughter facilities would be allowed to 
be delivered and slaughtered pending veterinary examination at a processing facility.  
Livestock not in transit to slaughter but to another stage of production would either be 
euthanized and rendered or returned to where transit originated from.  Livestock in 
transit during the initial movement ban is unaddressed in the current USDA APHIS 
FMD guidelines.    
 
2.11 Stamping Out 
Eradicating FMD would be the overall goal of any initial FMD control program.  The 
aggressive eradication policy of a “stamping out” policy is preferred because FMD is 
highly contagious and “stamping out” has proven to be the most timely and 
epidemiologically effective way for eradicating FMD (Hagerman 2009).  According to 
the OIE, the globally recognized animal health organization, stamping-out means: 
carrying out under the authority of the Veterinary Administration, on 
confirmation of a disease, the killing of the animals which are affected and those 
suspected of being affected in the herd and, where appropriate, those in other 
herds which have been exposed to infection by direct animal to animal contact, 
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or by indirect contact of a kind likely to cause the transmission of the causal 
pathogen. All susceptible animals, vaccinated or unvaccinated, on an infected 
premises should be killed and their carcasses destroyed by burning or burial, or 
by any other method which will eliminate the spread of infection through the 
carcasses or products of the animals killed (USDA 2005, page 6).    
Diagnosing, zoning, movement restrictions, euthanasia, disposal, and cleaning and 
disinfection are essential parts of a successful “stamping out” program.  Dangerous 
indirect contact is contact of an animal with a person, feedstuff, vehicle, or other fomite 
that has been on an infected premises shortly before the outbreak was discovered or after 
the discovery.  A downfall of a “stamping out” policy is the scope of welfare slaughter; 
in past outbreaks, welfare slaughter compared to the cost of controlling the disease on 
infected premises has been one half to ten times the cost (Whiting 2008; Bourn 2002; 
Dijkhuizen 1999; Saatkamp, Berentsen, and Horst 2000).   This is mainly because 
movement restrictions along with limited resources on hand have caused feed shortages 
on uninfected premises in the past. 
 
2.11.1 Stamping Out Policy and Trade Implications 
One important attribute of implementing a “stamping out” control program is that the 
OIE recognizes it as the response policy that allows for the fastest return to the disease 
classification of “FMD-free where vaccination is not practiced.”  There are negative 
trade implications that would impact the agribusiness industry if the OIE disease 
classification were changed.  Countries with the designation “FMD-free where 
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vaccination is not practiced” have the most lenient requirements for international trade 
of animals and animal products imposed by the OIE (USDA, APHIS 2008).  The earliest 
a country can return to the classification of “FMD-free where vaccination is not 
practiced” under the OIE standards is three months after the last occurrence of the virus; 
by establishing early zoning, using a stamping out policy, and enforcing movement 
restrictions and quarantine zones (USDA, APHIS 2008).  Countries where the disease is 
not considered endemic usually turn to “stamping out” as the primary method of 
eradication to protect international trade markets (Rich, Miller, and Winter-Nelson 
2005).  In countries like Uruguay, where the disease is considered endemic, vaccination 
is the primary control strategy practiced in the affected areas (OIE 2009).   
 
Establishing early zoning and enforcing movement restrictions is important because it 
can minimize the severity of international trade restrictions by allowing for 
compartmentalization and zoning of a country (OIE 2009).  OIE committees can approve 
the status of FMD free zones and compartments within a FMD infected country; thereby 
regionalizing the global trade implications to the infected areas (Garner, Fisher, and 
Murray 2002).  Paarlberg, Lee, and Seitzinger (2002) concluded that regionalizing an 
outbreak and maintaining FMD-free export markets would be critical to minimizing the 
adverse economic effects of a FMD out-break in the U.S.  If an outbreak occurred in the 
THPR, regionalization of the outbreak may be able to protect export markets for 
livestock producers located in other regions of the U.S.  Although, it is hard to predict 
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how other countries would react to a FMD outbreak since reactions are often politically 
driven.    
 
2.12 Zoning, Movement Restrictions, and Premises Designation 
Premises designation, proximity to the infected herd, and contact rates of the infected 
herds are some of the factors that dictate the size of response zones and movement 
restrictions put in place.  Response zones combined with movement restrictions and 
premises designation work to eradicate and stop the spread of FMD (Hagerman and 
McCarl 2009).  Federal response zones will ultimately be established by APHIS, but 
collaboration is needed with state and local officials to set understandable and 
enforceable quarantines (Giovachino et al. 2007).  Quarantine zones are theoretically 
designed as circular zones from the point of infection, but in reality they should be 
established using geographical markers which are easily identifiable and understood.  
Therefore, local knowledge is critical when deciding quarantine zone barriers 
(Giovachino et al. 2007).      
 
The three types of response zones USDA APHIS uses are: the control area, the 
surveillance zone, and the free zone.  The control area consists of the infected zone, 
which has a minimum designated size of 6.2 miles around each infected premises, and 
the buffer-surveillance zone, which has no minimum size.  In this study the infected 
zone is considered the quarantine zone. Depending of the scope and duration of a FMD 
outbreak, the USDA may try and regionalize the free zone and submit it to be recognized 
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by the OIE as “FMD free zone without vaccination in a FMD infected country”.  Table 2 
summarizes the response zones and purpose of each zone.   
 
 
Table 2. Response Zones Defined by the USDA APHIS 
Zone Size Purpose 
Control Area Entire state, tribal nation, or 
territory at minimum 
All animal movement will be stopped until 
the scope of the outbreak can be 
determined.  
Infected Zone 6.2 miles around each infected 
premises 
This will be the area of concentrated 
stamping out of the disease. Within this 
area all movement of animals and carries 
will be completely halted except by special 
permit.  
Buffer-Surveillance 
Zone 
No minimum size Surveillance of all susceptible animals with a 
minimum of 2 inspections every 14 days 
until the disease is eradicated. Movement is 
allowable using permits. 
Surveillance Zone Minimum size is 6.2 miles 
beyond the perimeter of the 
control area 
Surveillance of high risk herds with 
movement allowable using permits 
Free Zone Surrounds the surveillance 
zone and extends to the 
boundaries of the U.S.  
Surveillance continues according to 
standard animal health code practices.  
(USDA, APHIS 2007b) 
 
 
Premises designations are used to describe premises located within the control area.  
During a FMD outbreak APHIS uses four main premises designations: infected, contact, 
suspect, and at risk.  Table 3 describes the premises designations as defined by USDA 
APHIS.  This study only examines movement restriction and animal welfare issues for 
suspect premises located within the infected zone. 
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Table 3. Premises Designations Defined by the USDA APHIS 
Premises Type Status Action 
Infected  The FMD virus has been identified or 
is presumed to exist. 
All infected premises are located within the 
infected zone. An individual level quarantine 
is imposed on each infected premises and all 
susceptible animals are euthanized and 
disposed of.  
Contact Premises has been exposed either 
directly or indirectly to FMD carriers. 
All contact premises must be inside the 
control area. All susceptible animals are 
euthanized and disposed of except in special 
exceptions. Animals exempted from 
slaughter are placed under intensive 
surveillance for not less than 28 days.  
Suspect Premises with susceptible animals 
located in any response zone, but not 
classified as infected or contact.  
Premises are placed under quarantine and 
intensive surveillance for not less than 28 
days, past three inspections every 14 days, 
and possibly additional surveillance after 
removal from the surveillance zone to the 
free zone.  
At Risk Premises in the buffer surveillance 
zone with susceptible animals, but no 
clinical sign are present.  
Movement is allowed within the buffer 
zone, but not into the free zone. Non-
susceptible animals may move in and out of 
the free zone with a permit.  
(USDA, APHIS 2007b) 
 
 
2.13 FMD Response Policy Considerations 
Quarantine zones and movement restrictions have the potential to cause welfare 
slaughter.  Over the past decade, FMD outbreak policies concerning movement 
restrictions have led to the necessity of welfare slaughter (Garner, Fisher, and Murray 
2007).  Animals that have to be euthanized and disposed of for welfare slaughter reasons 
require the same resources needed to execute the disease eradication goals.  DeOtte Jr. 
and DeOtte III (2010) call for reexamining and finding alternatives to massive 
depopulation and carcass disposal because of resource availability.  Minimizing 
depopulation and carcass disposal in areas where livestock production is highly 
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concentrated is an important issue because as the number of livestock that needs to be 
euthanized and disposed of increases, the feasibility of completing those tasks according 
to the time specified in emergency plans decreases and the overall cost of the outbreak 
increases.  DeOtte Jr. and DeOtte III (2010) propose that limited depopulation be 
explored as an alternative mitigation strategy to “stamping out”.  Limited depopulation 
allows large numbers of exposed animals that are not exhibiting clinical signs of disease 
to continue towards harvest.  The authors acknowledge the there would be a loss in 
economic value for the harvested cattle and an increased cost for additional surveillance 
requirements, but that the protein value remains unchanged and the animals would be 
going to their “highest and best available good” (DeOtte and DeOtte 2010).  Garner, 
Fisher, and Murray (2002) also suggest that research be conducted in the area of 
modified movement restrictions, such as, movement being allowed directly to abattoirs 
in order to minimize conditions that warrant welfare slaughter.   
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Of the World Animal Health Organizations’ Listed Diseases, the most extensively 
researched disease is FMD.  The disease can spread quickly and become endemic if 
aggressive measures aren’t taken.  Much of the research has used Monte Carlo 
simulation methods to model FMD spread and analyze alternative mitigation tactics to 
identify the most effective and economical control tactics.  Previous studies have paid 
little attention to the effects on uninfected premises located within the quarantine zone of 
an outbreak, even though previous outbreaks have illustrated that uninfected quarantined 
premises face many challenges.  The possibility of an FMD outbreak is real, especially 
with the threat of bioterrorism.  
 
3.1 Prior Studies of FMD  
There have been many studies that focus on foot-and-mouth disease implications.  Most 
studies and publications use epidemiological models linked with economic framework to 
explore the affects of simulated FMD outbreaks.  Trade impacts, sector impacts, 
producer and consumer welfare, and mitigation strategies are commonly investigated 
using the linked framework.  While most studies incorporate quarantine zones, the direct 
linkage between the economic framework and quarantine implications for uninfected 
premises is lacking.   
 
Conrad (2004) used a commodity production cycle model to analyze the impacts of a 
widespread, large-scale FMD outbreak in both the beef and dairy industries in the US.  
37 
 
The model allowed for positive and negative feedback between the corn, beef, and dairy 
sectors.  Those three sectors account for approximately 40 percent of cash receipts for 
U.S. agricultural products.  The scenario examined a stamping out policy combined with 
export market losses of one or two years.  The cattle population was decreased by 10 
percent to illustrate the potential impact of the existing stamping out policy.  To model 
the loss of export markets, demand was decreased by 10 percent since exports account 
for approximately 10 percent of beef sales; it was assumed that domestic demand is only 
affected by changes in price.  Beef and dairy populations, prices, and sales were 
simulated over a 30 year horizon.  The results were unexpected and showed that the two 
year export ban provided the beef sector more stability in price and population compared 
to the one year export ban.  This suggests the aggressive actions to restore the export 
markets after a FMD outbreak may be counterproductive for the beef sector.  The author 
suggested that low cost preventative measures to protect cow and calf operations should 
be implemented along with quarantines and destruction of herds because protecting cow 
and calf operations helped stabilize beef prices, sales, and populations, as well as, corn 
prices and sales to feedlots.        
 
Hagerman and McCarl (2009) used the Davis Animal Disease Simulation (DADS) 
model combined with cost calculations to analyze the costs associated with varying 
control strategies and movement restriction for a simulated FMD outbreak in California.  
The study focused on the direct costs of disease mitigation based on varying movement 
restriction policies.  The control strategies considered varied detections times combined 
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with a no vaccination and vaccinations strategies.  A total of 16 control strategy 
scenarios combined 7, 10, 14, 21, or 22 day detection times from initial infection with 
vaccination policies of no vaccination, 10 km ring vaccination, and 20 km ring 
vaccination.  To obtain a distribution of the potential outcomes for the control strategies 
the DADS model was simulated 100 times for each control strategy using a random 
large dairy (more than 2,000 head) as the index herd.  Each epidemic trial was 
considered statistically independent in the economic model.  Three distinct movement 
policies that specifically applied to dairy operations were considered in the economic 
framework.  The first policy, “lockdown,” represented a complete movement ban on 
feed trucks and milk tankers.  The second movement policy, “dumping only,” 
represented a situation where feed trucks were allowed movement into and out of the 
response zone at an increased cost; although, movement of milk tankers wasn’t allow, 
therefore milk had to be dumped and indemnified.  The third policy, “business as usual,” 
represents a situation where normal business was allowed to continue, but at an 
increased cost of cleaning and disinfecting.  The cost categories accounted for were 
indemnity payments for animals and milk, forgone income, slaughter, cleaning and 
disinfecting, surveillance, vaccination, and additional feed costs. 
 
The “dumping only” and “business as usual” policies, which allowed feed to be trucked 
into a response zone, were preferred to the “lockdown” policy, which did not allow for 
feed to be brought in.  In addition, generalized stochastic dominance showed that risk 
neutral and risk adverse decision makers slightly preferred the “dumping only” policy to 
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the “business as usual” movement policy.  The study concluded that movement 
restriction policies that allow feed to be brought onto a premises in the control area is 
less expensive than movement restriction policies that don’t allow for feed to be brought 
in (Hagerman and McCarl 2009).  Across all three movement restriction policies early 
detection (7 days) combined with no vaccination produced the lowest median control 
cost per head.  The additional cost of feed plus cleaning and disinfecting feed trucks is 
far less than the cost of additional indemnity payments and forgone income.  This 
research will use similar cost calculation framework to analyze movement restrictions in 
the THPR for large feedlots.   
 
Pendell, Leatherman, Schroeder, and Alward (2007) examined the economic impacts 
associated with a simulated FMD outbreak in Southwest Kansas using the North 
American Animal Disease Spread Model (NAADSM) combined with economic models.  
The research focused on the regional economic implications under varying introduction 
scenarios.  NAADSM is a spatial state-transition simulation model developed by USDA 
APHIS.  Partial equilibrium analysis and input-output approaches were used to build the 
economic framework that evaluated welfare changes and regional impacts.  The region 
of study was chosen because, similar to the THPR, Southwest Kansas is characterized by 
a high concentration of large confined cattle feeding operations.  A stamping out control 
method was simulated 1,000 times for each scenario in the epidemiological NAADSM.  
The expected values obtained from the NAADSM were then entered into the economic 
framework.  The introduction scenarios considered were introduction on a single cow-
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calf herd, introduction on a single medium sized feedlot (10,000-30,000 head capacity), 
and introduction simultaneously on five large feedlots (more than 40,000 head capacity).  
The last scenario, where FMD was introduced simultaneously on five large feedlots, was 
used to illustrate the impacts of what an intentional introduction could cause.  The 
probability of the outbreak being large is much greater in the simultaneous introduction 
scenario compared to the single introduction scenarios.   
 
In the scenario where FMD was introduced in a single cow-calf herd the average number 
of destroyed livestock was approximately 126,000 head and the disease outbreak lasted 
29 days.  Total producer surplus for the beef industry decreased by $43.2 million.  In 
addition, the total economic impact for the region was approximately $32.1 million.  In 
the scenario where FMD was introduced in a single medium feedlot the average number 
of destroyed livestock was approximately 407,000 head and the disease outbreak lasted 
39 days.  Total producer surplus for the beef industry decreased by $166.5 million.  The 
total economic impact for the region was approximately $193 million for introduction in 
a single medium feedlot.  In the scenario where FMD was introduced simultaneously 
into five large feedlots the average number of destroyed livestock was approximately 
1.68 million head and the disease outbreak lasted 89 days.  Total producer surplus for the 
beef industry decreased by $728.5 million.  In addition, the total economic impact for the 
region was approximately $940 million.  The average economic damage for the 
simultaneous introduction scenarios is exponentially greater than the other two 
introduction scenarios on smaller singular premises.  The authors concluded that disease 
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surveillance, management investment, and management strategies need to be a main 
focus in regions with large concentrated cattle feeding operations.  The results of 
Pendell, Leatherman, Schroeder, and Alward (2007) provide justification for looking at 
management strategies for uninfected premises in the THPR, because as modeled 
movement restrictions may be enforced for long periods of time.   
 
Another study estimated the producer costs associated with a quarantine affecting a 
commercial feedlot located in Southwest Kansas (Stroade and Schroder 2007).  The 
main cost categories computed were additional feed cost, opportunity cost, and forgone 
future profit.  The main problem associated with quarantines investigated by this study 
was the inability to market the fed cattle at the desired time because of movement 
restrictions, which prohibited the movement of cattle off the premises.  A discount rate 
of eight percent was assumed for the opportunity cost and forgone profit calculations.  
The main focus was on producer costs.  This study ignored reduced yield-grade and 
heavy-weight discounts.  It also ignored the potential for loss of customers and other 
added costs associated with movement restriction that could arise.  Therefore, the results 
were considered to be a conservative estimate of the cost associated with movement 
restrictions.  Additional feed cost was the largest cost category each week of quarantine.  
The total quarantine cost was approximately $10,275 for the first week of quarantine for 
a 40,000 head feedlot that marketed 1,900 head per week.  The cost increased 
exponentially as the quarantine continued because new cattle reached optimum 
marketing each week.  The total quarantine cost grows to $197,853 for a quarantine 
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lasting five weeks and to $921,562 for a quarantine lasting ten weeks (Stroade and 
Schroder 2007).  This study illustrated the potential financial risk commercial feedlots 
face because of quarantines and movement restrictions. 
 
Ward, Highfield, Vongseng, and Garner (2009) adapted the AUSSPREAD model 
(Garner and Beckett 2005; Beckett and Garner 2007) to fit the THPR specifications.  
The considered infection pathways parameters were direct contact, indirect contact, 
spread through sale barns, and windborne spread.  Contact and spread probabilities were 
estimated from survey data and local industry opinion.  In total thirteen herd types were 
identified as susceptible to an FMD outbreak, five of those herd types were feedlots.  
The five types of feedlots identified were i) company feedlot- herd of ≥50,000 head, ii) 
stockholder feedlot- herd of ≥20,000 to <50,000 head, iii) custom feedlot- herd of 
≥5,000 to <20,000 head, iv) backgrounder feedlot, and v) yearling-pasture feedlot; the 
last two types of feedlots were not classified based on capacity information but their 
mean herd sizes were 6,171 and 2,453 head, respectively.  Four different types of single-
site introduction index herds were studied in the epidemiological model: company 
feedlot backgrounder feedlot, large grazing herd (more than 100 head), and a backyard 
herd (less than 10 head).  AUSSPREAD was used to simulate the spread of the disease 
under the four index herd types combined with 16 various control strategy combinations.  
The control strategies varied detection time, vaccination strategy, vaccination 
availability, and surveillance levels.  The index herd type and mitigation strategy 
employed were the two main factors associated with the predicted outbreak length and 
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the number of herds depopulated.  Epidemics initiated in company feedlots had median 
lengths of 25-52 days, but had a range up to 188 days.  The average number of herds that 
had to be depopulated ranged from 4-101 for epidemics initiated in company feedlots 
(Ward et al. 2009).  This research will utilize the epidemiological data from four specific 
scenarios to quantify the number and size of uninfected feedlots located within the 
quarantine zone.     
 
Elbakidze et al. (2009) linked the AUSSPREAD model (as described in Ward, 
Highfield, Vongseng, and Garner (2009)) with an economic costing module to evaluate 
mitigation strategies of FMD in the THPR under various introduction scenarios.  In 
order to evaluate strategy desirability based on risk preferences, stochastic dominance-
based breakeven risk aversion coefficient analysis was used.  The two reported outbreak 
costs calculated by the economic costing module were losses incurred within the cattle 
industry and the cost of the disease eradication strategy.  Losses incurred by the cattle 
industry were calculated by summing the gross lost value of animals plus forgone 
income due to temporary business inactivity caused by not being allowed to restock, 
which was assumed to be at least 60 days after cleaning and disinfection took place.  
Disease eradication strategies were based on the costs associated with vaccination, 
surveillance, slaughter, appraisal, euthanasia, carcass disposal, cleaning and disinfection, 
and quarantine implementation.  It was assumed that vaccinated livestock lost 50 percent 
of their value.  Quarantine costs were only accounted for in herds with more than 50 
head.  The economic model assumed quarantine of all herds in the “neighborhood” of 
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infected premises plus all direct and indirect contact premises.  Quarantine costs were 
dependent on number of herds under quarantine, daily disinfection cost per head, loss 
per day per animal type, and number of days that the herd was under movement 
restrictions.  Quarantines costs were not directly discussed in the results or conclusion of 
the study, but were calculated under the assumed cost of $50, $75, and $100 per head per 
day and were based on small (less than 100 head), medium (100 to 500 head), and large 
(more than 500 head) herd sizes, respectively. 
 
The results showed that total costs potential of FMD originating in a large feedlot was 
approximately $1 billion.  Introduction under the three alternative index herd types 
yielded smaller total costs potentials that ranged from $600 to $800 million.  Early 
detection generally provided the greatest cost saving of any eradication strategy 
considered in the study.  In addition the economic cost differences between early and 
late detection were significantly different at the 99 percent level of confidence for all 
introduction scenarios, with early detection resulting in significantly lower costs.  Early 
vaccination vs. delayed vaccination was also significantly different across all 
introduction scenarios at the 99 percent level of confidence, resulting in significantly 
higher total economic costs for all premises types.  All dominate strategies incorporated 
slaughter of infected herds, slaughter of dangerous contact herds, and early detection.  
Eradication strategies that combined enhanced surveillance with slaughter of infected 
herds, slaughter of dangerous contact herds, and early detection were dominate across all 
values of RAC for backyard introduction scenarios.  The above strategy also dominated 
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large feedlot introduction when the RAC is between 0.01-0.099, introduction into 
backgrounder feedlots when the RAC is less than -0.099, and introduction into large 
grazing operations when the RAC is more than 0.13.  The eradication strategy of regular 
surveillance combined with slaughter of infected herds, slaughter of dangerous contact 
herds, and early detection was dominate in large feedlot introductions when the RAC is 
less than 0.01 or greater then 0.099, backgrounder feedlot introductions when the RAC 
is greater than -0.099, and in large grazing operation inductions when the RAC is less 
than 0.13.  My research will use a similar costing framework to explore movement 
policies that incorporate continuity of business practices during an outbreak, such as, 
allowing the movement of livestock to slaughter from uninfected premises. 
 
3.2 Summary 
The previous literature concerning FMD has mainly focused on control and mitigation 
strategies for infected premises; little attention has been paid to the affect on uninfected 
premises.  With the exception of the quarantine assumptions in the High Plains Project 
(Elbakidze et al. 2009), all previous studies focusing on the implications of FMD 
outbreaks in the THPR have ignored welfare slaughter and how movement restrictions 
will affect quarantined uninfected premises.  In addition, none of the previous literature 
on FMD has addressed how the timing of an outbreak will affect the costs associated 
with movement restrictions.   
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4. METHODOLOGY  
This project will focus on and study how welfare strategies for uninfected large feedlots 
affect FMD outbreak costs for a case study in the Texas High Plains.  It expands 
previous work completed in the High Plains Project (Elbakidze et al. 2009; Ward et al. 
2009) by applying the quarantine and herd results for quarantined uninfected large 
feedlots coupled with a costing framework that compares a feed provision strategy to a 
welfare slaughter strategy.  Linked epidemic-economic models, such as the models used 
in this study, are commonly used to examine FMD impacts and mitigation strategies 
(Elbakidze et al. 2009; Hagerman 2009).  The stochastic epidemic results are often used 
as statistically independent trials in the economic model; this gives the economic results 
a range and distribution.  This research is unique in that it adds a seasonal component to 
the costing framework in order to highlight the differences in cost between outbreak 
initiation months.  
 
4.1 Epidemiological Model  
The High Plains Project (Elbakidze et al. 2009; Ward et al. 2009) used the simulated 
epidemic model AUSSPREAD to estimate the spread of a FMD outbreak in the THPR.  
Through extensive data collection concerning contact rates and premises spatial 
distribution, the AUSSPREAD model was calibrated to estimated disease spread and 
status for susceptible premises types in the THPR.  Thirteen susceptible herd types were 
identified in the THPR (Table 4).  This study only focuses on feedlots; the types of 
feedlots considered are company feedlots, stockholder feedlots, and custom feedlots.  
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Since these feedlots are the larger of the operation types shown in Table 4, I will refer to 
these three types of feedlots collectively as “large feedlots” throughout the paper. These 
feedlots are assumed to have similar production practices, cost structures, and movement 
requirements.  AUSSPREAD is a stochastic state transition model where herds are 
classified as susceptible, latent, infected, or recovered.  The High Plains Project (Ward et 
al. 2009) examined 64 scenarios (Table 5) that varied index herd type, disease detection 
time, disease control methods, and surveillance levels.  This project used the results from 
four of the 64 scenarios as input variables in the costing framework.   
 
 
Table 4. Susceptible Herd Types by Number of Herds and Mean Herd Size 
Herd Type Number of Herds Mean Herd Size Herd Size Parameters 
Company Feedlot 5 69,600 ≥ 50,000 Head 
Stockholder Feedlot 32 33,159 ≥ 20,000 and < 50,000 Head 
Custom Feedlot 25 11,360 ≥5,000 and <20,000 Head 
Backgrounder Feedlot 7 6,171 Not Specified  
Yearling-pasture Feedlot 22 2,453 <5,000 Head 
Dairy-calf Raiser 1 8,000 8,000 Head 
Small Beef 6,403 30 ≥1,000 Head 
Large Beef 754 260 <1,000 Head 
Small Dairy 14 636 <1,000 Head 
Large Dairy 62 5,578 ≥1,000 Head 
Backyard 2,435 4 ≤10 Head 
Small Ruminant 913 14 N/A 
Swine 2 2,915 N/A 
(Ward et al. 2009)
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Table 5. Scenarios from the Texas High Plains Project 
Strategy Index Herd   
 Company Owned Feedlot Backgrounder 
Feedlot 
Large Beef Backyard 
Ring slaughter, regular surveillance, slaughter 
of infected, slaughter of dc’s*, early detection 
1 2 3 4 
Ring slaughter, regular surveillance, slaughter 
of infected, slaughter of dc’s, late detection 
5 6 7 8 
Ring slaughter, regular surveillance, slaughter 
of infected, slaughter of dc’s, late detection, 
targeted vaccination, adequate vaccine 
9 10 11 12 
Ring slaughter, regular surveillance, slaughter 
of infected, slaughter of dc’s, late detection, 
targeted vaccination, inadequate vaccine 
13 14 15 16 
Enhanced surveillance, slaughter of infected, 
slaughter of dc’s, early detection 
17 18 19 20 
Enhanced surveillance, slaughter of infected, 
slaughter of dc’s, late detection 
21 22 23 24 
Enhanced surveillance, slaughter of infected, 
slaughter of dc’s, late detection, targeted 
vaccination, adequate vaccine 
25 26 27 28 
Enhanced surveillance, slaughter of infected, 
slaughter of dc’s, late detection, targeted 
vaccination, inadequate vaccine 
29 30 31 32 
Slaughter of infected, slaughter of dc’s, regular 
surveillance, ring vaccination, early detection, 
inadequate vaccine 
33 34 35 36 
Slaughter of infected, slaughter of dc’s, regular 
surveillance, early detection 
37 38 39 40 
Slaughter of infected, slaughter of dc’s, regular 
surveillance, late detection, ring vaccination, 
adequate vaccine 
41 42 43 44 
Slaughter of infected, slaughter of dc’s, regular 
surveillance, ring vaccination, late detection, 
inadequate vaccine 
45 46 47 48 
Slaughter of infected, slaughter of dc’s, regular 
surveillance, early detection, targeted 
vaccination, adequate vaccine 
49 50 51 52 
Slaughter of infected, slaughter of dc’s, regular 
surveillance, late detection 
53 54 55 56 
Slaughter of infected, slaughter of dc’s, regular 
surveillance, late detection, targeted 
vaccination, adequate vaccine 
57 58 59 60 
Slaughter of infected, slaughter of dc’s, regular 
surveillance, early detection, ring vaccination, 
adequate vaccine 
61 62 63 64 
* Direct contact herds  
(Ward et al. 2009) 
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4.1.1 Scenarios 
The four scenarios examined in this project were scenario 17, scenario 21, scenario 37, 
and scenario 53 (Table 5).  Additional scenarios were not included in order to reduce the 
number of confounding factors in the analysis.  In all four scenarios the index herd, the 
herd in which FMD was initially confirmed, was a company owned feedlot.  Early 
detection, late detection, regular surveillance, and enhanced surveillance were mitigation 
tactics that varied across the four scenarios examined.   
 
In the AUSSPREAD model early detection was defined as the discovery of FMD seven 
days post-infection in the index herd, whereas, late detection was defined as, discovering 
FMD 14 days post-infection in the index herd.  Surveillance visits were prioritized by 
user-defined categorization; for regular surveillance scenarios, suspect premises were 
visited twice per week during a 30 day period, with visits discontinuing if the premises 
hadn’t been visited within 10 days.  Enhanced surveillance assumed that suspect 
premises were visited four times per week during a 30-day period, with visits ceasing if 
the premises hadn’t been visited in the previous 20 days.  In each case, if the premises 
had five consecutive surveillance visits in which no disease is detected, surveillance is 
discontinued. In addition, if a herd is found to be infected at any surveillance visit, the 
surveillance is discontinued and depopulation, disinfection and disposal procedures are 
initiated.  
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Scenario 17 combined early detection with enhanced surveillance, while scenario 21 
combined late detection with enhanced surveillance.  Scenario 37 combined early 
detection with regular surveillance, and scenario 53, combined late detection with 
regular surveillance.  The four scenarios were simulated 100 times by the AUSSPREAD 
model and the stochastic epidemiological outputs for the number of head, days under 
quarantine, and number of surveillance visits at the end of the outbreak were used as 
input variables in the costing framework.   
 
4.2 Economic Model 
Seasonality, the regular patterns and variations occurring within a year, is common 
throughout most sectors of the agriculture industry.  Seasonality is often driven by 
biological factors and climate, which result in systematic supply fluctuations throughout 
the year.  For example, seasonality in cattle sales and movements are created mainly 
because the climatic seasons greatly influence the timing of calf weaning and stocker 
cattle production (Peel and Meyer 2002).  Consumer demand for beef also has a seasonal 
component; demand increases during the spring and summer months when consumers 
tend to barbeque (Hirsch and Person 2010).   
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Seasonality and price are two main factors that affect feedlot managers’ decisions 
regarding cattle placement levels.  Throughout the year the number of head and the 
mixture of heavy and lightweight cattle in the herd
2
 fluctuate on feedlots to meet supply 
and demand factors.  In order to capture the seasonal effects a monthly feedlot cattle 
weight mixture was created.  
 
4.2.1 Monthly Feedlot Cattle Weight Mixture 
The monthly feedlot cattle weight mixture shows the percentage of steers and heifers by 
weight category for any given month for large feedlots in the THPR.  It was developed 
based on marketing data collected by Gerry Kuhl from Kansas State University. The 
marketing data provided monthly averages for marketed steers and heifers from 22 
Kansas feedlots. Monthly averages for the number of marketings, final weight, days on 
feed, average daily gain, and the feed to grain ration on a dry basis from January 1997- 
October 2010 were used to build the monthly feedlot cattle weight mixture (Table 6). 
                                                 
2 For simplification, I will use the term “herd” to refer to the collective cattle on the feedlot 
at any given time, including placements, cattle on feed but not yet ready for market, and 
marketed cattle.  
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Table 6. Monthly Kansas Feedlot Data Used to Create the Monthly Texas Feedlot Cattle Weight 
Mixture 
Steer 
Marketing 
Month 
Calculated 
Incoming 
Weight 
(Pounds) 
DOF  
(Days) 
ADG 
(Pounds) 
Final 
Weight 
(Pounds) 
Feed/Gain 
(Dry Basis) 
(Pounds) 
January 789 145 3.411 1285 6.24 
February 777 149 3.278 1266 6.34 
March 758 156 3.161 1251 6.34 
April 726 163 3.048 1222 6.25 
May 726 163 3.144 1239 6.04 
June 740 156 3.369 1266 5.84 
July 765 151 3.479 1289 5.87 
August 784 149 3.511 1306 5.93 
September 813 140 3.566 1312 5.92 
October 800 142 3.575 1309 5.94 
November 807 138 3.580 1301 6.05 
December 802 141 3.569 1305 6.09 
Heifer 
Marketing 
Month 
Calculated 
Incoming 
Weight 
(Pounds) 
DOF 
(Days) 
ADG 
(Pounds) 
Final 
Weight 
(Pounds) 
Feed/Gain 
(Dry Basis) 
(Pounds) 
January 722 146 3.136 1178 6.41 
February 716 148 3.040 1164 6.45 
March 699 155 2.908 1149 6.53 
April 669 162 2.783 1120 6.47 
May 670 162 2.823 1126 6.34 
June 677 158 2.967 1144 6.14 
July 690 155 3.030 1160 6.20 
August 710 150 3.061 1170 6.23 
September 728 144 3.124 1178 6.21 
October 724 145 3.146 1180 6.23 
November 724 141 3.212 1177 6.21 
December 720 142 3.208 1176 6.25 
DOF: Days on Feed 
ADG: Average Daily Gain 
 
 
When developing the monthly feedlot cattle weight mixture it was assumed that feedlots 
operated at full capacity throughout the year.  Thus, a 5,000 head capacity feedlot will 
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always have 5,000 head on site; what varies throughout the year is the cattle weight 
mixture across the herd.  In addition, it was assumed that Kansas feedlots’ monthly 
feedlot cattle weight mixture was similar to Texas High Plains feedlots’ monthly feedlot 
cattle weight mixture because the two locations have similar climates and production 
practices.  However the regions are not identical, and based upon expert advice, 
adjustments were made in the steer to heifer ratio in order to fit Texas production more 
closely.  This adjustment was made using the average Texas quarterly cattle on feed 
percentages (1997 to 2010) for steers and heifers.  
 
One item needed herein is a livestock age distribution by month.  The Kansas feedlot 
data was manipulated to obtain average placement date for steers and heifers by 
subtracting the average days on feed from the marketing date, which was assumed to be 
the first of each month.  Incoming weights were obtained by subtracting the weight 
gained from the final live weight.  Using the placement date, incoming weight, and 
average daily gain information, the lifespan of steers and heifers were tracked by weight 
class across months.  The number of head in each weight class per month was summed 
and divided by the total number of same-sex head; for example the number of heifers in 
the weight category 700-749 pounds in June was divided by the total number of heifers 
in June.  Tables 7-8 show the proportion of steers and heifers by weight category for 
each month for Kansas feedlots. 
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Table 7. Kansas Steer Mixture by Month and Weight Class 
 Feeding 
Month 
650-699 
Pounds 
700-749 
Pounds 
750-799 
Pounds 
800-849 
Pounds 
850-899 
Pounds 
900-949 
Pounds 
950-999 
Pounds 
January 0% 0% 20% 0% 20% 0% 17% 
February 0% 0% 0% 0% 24% 0% 23% 
March 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 22% 
April 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 0% 20% 
May 0% 0% 0% 0% 15% 0% 17% 
June 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 0% 17% 
July 0% 0% 0% 0% 19% 0% 15% 
August 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 20% 
September 0% 0% 18% 0% 17% 0% 17% 
October 0% 0% 19% 0% 18% 0% 17% 
November 0% 0% 20% 0% 18% 0% 17% 
December 0% 0% 22% 0% 18% 16% 0% 
 Feeding 
Month 
1000-
1049 
Pounds 
1050-
1099 
Pounds 
1100-
1149 
Pounds 
1150-
1199 
Pounds 
1200-
1249 
Pounds 
1250-
1299 
Pounds 
1300-
1349 
Pounds 
January 15% 0% 0% 14% 0% 14% 0% 
February 19% 0% 17% 0% 16% 1% 0% 
March 0% 22% 18% 0% 16% 1% 0% 
April 0% 23% 0% 22% 19% 0% 0% 
May 0% 21% 0% 23% 1% 23% 0% 
June 0% 19% 0% 24% 0% 27% 0% 
July 0% 18% 0% 22% 0% 0% 26% 
August 0% 16% 0% 20% 0% 0% 24% 
September 0% 17% 0% 13% 0% 0% 17% 
October 0% 16% 0% 17% 0% 13% 1% 
November 0% 16% 0% 15% 0% 0% 16% 
December 0% 15% 0% 14% 0% 14% 0% 
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Table 8. Kansas Heifer Mixture by Month and Weight Class  
 Feeding 
Month 
650-699 
Pounds 
700-749 
Pounds 
750-799 
Pounds 
800-849 
Pounds 
850-899 
Pounds 
900-949 
Pounds 
950-999 
Pounds 
January 0% 17% 18% 0% 15% 0% 16% 
February 0% 0% 21% 0% 22% 0% 18% 
March 0% 0% 22% 0% 20% 0% 21% 
April 0% 0% 18% 0% 22% 0% 20% 
May 0% 0% 18% 0% 18% 0% 22% 
June 0% 0% 16% 0% 19% 0% 19% 
July 0% 0% 21% 0% 16% 0% 19% 
August 0% 0% 22% 0% 21% 0% 16% 
September 0% 17% 17% 0% 18% 0% 18% 
October 16% 0% 17% 0% 17% 0% 18% 
November 15% 0% 16% 0% 17% 0% 16% 
December 18% 0% 15% 0% 16% 0% 16% 
 Feeding 
Month 
1000-
1049 
Pounds 
1050-
1099 
Pounds 
1100-
1149 
Pounds 
1150-
1199 
Pounds 
1200-
1249 
Pounds 
1250-
1299 
Pounds 
1300-
1349 
Pounds 
January 0% 17% 0% 17% 0% 0% 0% 
February 19% 0% 20% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
March 18% 0% 18% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
April 0% 21% 18% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
May 0% 20% 22% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
June 0% 24% 0% 21% 0% 0% 0% 
July 0% 19% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 
August 0% 20% 0% 20% 0% 0% 0% 
September 0% 13% 0% 17% 0% 0% 0% 
October 0% 18% 0% 14% 0% 0% 0% 
November 0% 18% 0% 18% 0% 0% 0% 
December 0% 16% 0% 18% 0% 0% 0% 
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Table 9. Average Quarterly Texas Cattle on Feed Percentages by Sex (2007-2010) 
  Heifer Steer 
January 1 -March 31 39% 61% 
April 1- June 30 39% 61% 
July 1- September 30 41% 59% 
October 1- December 31 40% 60% 
 
 
Average quarterly Texas steer and heifer cattle on feed percentages (Table 9) from 1997 
to 2010 were multiplied with the proportion of steers and heifers by weight class and 
month for Kansas feedlots in order to match the steer to heifer ratio of Texas feedlots. 
 
Tables 10-11 present the monthly herd mixture percentages by weight category and 
outbreak month for large Texas feedlots.  The herd was divided into weight categories 
by 50 pound weight classes so that at the start of any new feeding month cattle would 
move into a new weight class, separate from any of the other lots of cattle based on their 
average daily gain in the previous feeding month. Weight categories with 0% show that 
no cattle began the month in that weight category.  The monthly feedlot cattle weight 
mixture percentages were used to classify cattle in three broad groups: placements 
(Table 12), cattle on feed (Table 13), and marketings (Table 14).  Placements are cattle 
that entered the feedlot during the previous month before the outbreak, steer placements 
weighed between 750 pounds and 799 pounds, while, heifer placements weighed 
between 650 pounds and 799 pounds depending on the placement month.  Cattle on feed 
are all cattle that entered the feedlot earlier than the previous month before the outbreak 
began and won’t reach market weights within the next month, steer cattle on feed 
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weighed between 850 pounds and 1,249 pounds, while, heifer cattle on feed weighed 
between 750 pounds and 1099 pounds.  Marketings are cattle that will reach market 
weight and be harvested within the next month, steer marketings weighed between 1200 
pounds and 1349 pounds, while, heifer marketings weighed between 1100 pounds and 
1199 pounds depanding on the marketed month.  There is overlap between the 
placement weight categories and cattle on feed weight categories for heifers because 
light weight heifers were placed in October, November, and December and based on 
their average daily gain after a month of feeding they were in similar weight categories 
as heavier heifers placed in March through August.  The sum of total placements, cattle 
on feed, and marketings for each month equals 100 percent.  Each monthly lot of steer 
and heifer placements had unique average incoming weights, days on feed, average daily 
gains, feed to gain ratios, and final weights.  It is important to note that no placement lots 
were placed in February and two placement lots were placed September; this was a 
consequence of how the data was manipulated to fit the study.  It occurred because of the 
assumption that finished cattle were marketed on the first day of the month, subtracting 
the average days on feed from the first day of each month arranged placement lots so 
that February placements didn’t exist and September had two placement lots, one in the 
beginning of the month and one towards the end of the month.  The January herd 
mixture is composed of placement lots from August, September, October, November, 
and December.  Whereas, the July herd mixture is composed of placement lots from 
March, April, May, and June.   
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Table 10. Texas Steer Mixture by Weight Category and Month 
 
 Feeding 
Month 
650-699 
Pounds 
700-749 
Pounds 
750-799 
Pounds 
800-849 
Pounds 
850-899 
Pounds 
900-949 
Pounds 
950-999 
Pounds 
January 0% 0% 12% 0% 12% 0% 10% 
February 0% 0% 0% 0% 14% 0% 14% 
March 0% 0% 0% 0% 12% 0% 14% 
April 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 0% 12% 
May 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 0% 10% 
June 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 0% 10% 
July 0% 0% 0% 0% 11% 0% 9% 
August 0% 0% 0% 0% 12% 0% 12% 
September 0% 0% 11% 0% 10% 0% 10% 
October 0% 0% 11% 0% 11% 0% 10% 
November 0% 0% 12% 0% 10% 0% 10% 
December 0% 0% 13% 0% 11% 10% 0% 
Feeding 
Month 
1000-
1049 
Pounds 
1050-
1099 
Pounds 
1100-
1149 
Pounds 
1150-
1199 
Pounds 
1200-
1249 
Pounds 
1250-
1299 
Pounds 
1300-
1349 
Pounds 
January 9% 0% 0% 9% 0% 8% 0% 
February 12% 0% 10% 0% 10% 0% 0% 
March 0% 13% 11% 0% 10% 0% 0% 
April 0% 14% 0% 13% 11% 0% 0% 
May 0% 13% 0% 14% 1% 14% 0% 
June 0% 12% 0% 14% 0% 17% 0% 
July 0% 11% 0% 13% 0% 0% 16% 
August 0% 9% 0% 12% 0% 0% 14% 
September 0% 10% 0% 8% 0% 0% 10% 
October 0% 10% 0% 10% 0% 8% 0% 
November 0% 9% 0% 9% 0% 0% 9% 
December 0% 9% 0% 9% 0% 8% 0% 
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Table 11. Texas Heifer Mixture by Weight Category and Month 
 Feeding 
Month 
650-699 
Pounds 
700-749 
Pounds 
750-799 
Pounds 
800-849 
Pounds 
850-899 
Pounds 
900-949 
Pounds 
950-999 
Pounds 
January 0% 7% 7% 0% 6% 0% 6% 
February 0% 0% 8% 0% 9% 0% 7% 
March 0% 0% 9% 0% 8% 0% 8% 
April 0% 0% 7% 0% 9% 0% 8% 
May 0% 0% 7% 0% 7% 0% 9% 
June 0% 0% 6% 0% 8% 0% 7% 
July 0% 0% 9% 0% 6% 0% 8% 
August 0% 0% 9% 0% 9% 0% 7% 
September 0% 7% 7% 0% 7% 0% 7% 
October 6% 0% 7% 0% 7% 0% 7% 
November 6% 0% 6% 0% 7% 0% 7% 
December 7% 0% 6% 0% 6% 0% 7% 
 Feeding 
Month 
1000-
1049 
Pounds 
1050-
1099 
Pounds 
1100-
1149 
Pounds 
1150-
1199 
Pounds 
1200-
1249 
Pounds 
1250-
1299 
Pounds 
1300-
1349 
Pounds 
January 0% 7% 0% 7% 0% 0% 0% 
February 7% 0% 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
March 7% 0% 7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
April 0% 8% 7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
May 0% 8% 9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
June 0% 9% 0% 8% 0% 0% 0% 
July 0% 8% 0% 10% 0% 0% 0% 
August 0% 8% 0% 8% 0% 0% 0% 
September 0% 5% 0% 7% 0% 0% 0% 
October 0% 7% 0% 6% 0% 0% 0% 
November 0% 7% 0% 7% 0% 0% 0% 
December 0% 7% 0% 7% 0% 0% 0% 
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Table 12. Herd Mixture Placement Percentages by Calendar Month 
  Steer Heifer Total 
January 12% 7% 19% 
February 0% 0% 0% 
March 12% 9% 21% 
April 10% 7% 17% 
May 9% 7% 16% 
June 8% 6% 14% 
July 11% 9% 20% 
August 12% 9% 21% 
September 21% 14% 35% 
October 11% 6% 17% 
November 12% 6% 18% 
December 13% 7% 20% 
 
 
Table 13. Herd Mixture Cattle on Feed Percentages by Calendar Month 
  Steer Heifer Total 
January 41% 26% 67% 
February 51% 31% 82% 
March 39% 23% 62% 
April 40% 25% 65% 
May 38% 24% 62% 
June 36% 25% 61% 
July 33% 22% 55% 
August 33% 24% 57% 
September 28% 20% 48% 
October 41% 29% 70% 
November 39% 27% 66% 
December 39% 26% 65% 
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Table 14. Herd Mixture Marketing Percentages by Calendar Month 
  Steer Heifer Total 
January 8% 6% 14% 
February 10% 8% 18% 
March 10% 7% 17% 
April 11% 7% 18% 
May 14% 8% 22% 
June 17% 8% 25% 
July 15% 10% 25% 
August 14% 8% 22% 
September 10% 7% 17% 
October 8% 5% 13% 
November 9% 7% 16% 
December 8% 7% 15% 
 
 
4.3 Unrestricted Feed Strategy  
The unrestricted feed strategy assumes that feed is allowed to be brought onto the 
uninfected, quarantined large feedlots and that finished cattle are allowed to be 
transported for harvest to nearby packing plants.  However this occurs at an increased 
cost reflecting cleaning and disinfection of trucks as they enter and exit the premises.  
This strategy was designed to allow business to continue for the feed elevators, feedlots, 
and packing plants in the region and reduce overall economic stress.  It is important to 
note that as more movement was allowed onto and off of quarantined feedlots the risk of 
spreading the disease increased.  The AUSSPREAD model did not account for the 
increased probability of spread due to movements associated with the unrestricted feed 
strategy; therefore this study will ignore the increased risk of disease spread caused by 
the unrestricted feed strategy movement requirements. This is equivalent to assuming 
that the disinfection of trucks is 100% effective.  
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The unrestricted feed strategy costing framework involved three main cost components; 
feeding costs, finished cattle marketing costs, and surveillance costs.  Each was 
implemented in a costing module.  The feeding costs module calculated the cost and tons 
of feed stuffs needed throughout the quarantine for each possible outbreak month.  It 
also calculated the number of feed trucks required to deliver feed throughout the 
quarantine and the hauling and decontamination costs associated with the feed 
deliveries.  The finished cattle marketing costs module calculated the total number of 
cattle marketed during the quarantine period and the number of cattle trucks needed to 
haul the finished cattle to the packing plant.  The indemnity payment amounts, cattle 
truck hauling costs, and cattle truck decontamination costs were also calculated within 
the marketing costs module.  In the unrestricted feed strategy, indemnity payments were 
assumed to be the difference between the regular average monthly market value and 
reduced market value received.  Indemnity payment calculations are discusses in more 
detail in the marketing costs section.  The surveillance costs calculated the total cost of 
surveillance team visits and tests for the uninfected quarantined large feedlots.  The sum 
of the feeding costs, marketing costs, and surveillance costs makeup the total 
unrestricted feed strategy cost.     
 
4.3.1 Feeding Costs 
During the time the feedlot is placed under quarantine it was assumed that feeding 
continued at the pre-outbreak level so that cattle continued gaining weight at the normal 
rate and finished at the expected time.  It was assumed that large feedlots had enough 
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feed on hand to feed cattle for five days, therefore the number of days that require feed 
to be brought onto the feedlot was the total quarantine period length minus five days.  
The assumed feed ration for the feedlots was a mixture of steamed flake corn, soybean 
meal, and hay.  It was assumed that corn was processed and mixed with the other feed 
ingredients on the feedlot meaning that corn was delivered by the ton.  The ration was 
composed of 87.1 percent dry matter; Table 15 shows the feed stuff ingredient 
percentages used in the ration and their percent dry matter.  The ratio was designed 
based on the expert opinion of Dr. David Anderson and the National Research Council 
(1996). 
 
 
Table 15. Large Feedlots Feed Ration Ingredient Percentages and Percent Dry Matter 
Feed Ration Ingredients  Percent of Ration Percent Dry 
Matter Steam Flaked Corn 70% 86% 
 Soybean Meal  10% 89% 
Hay  20% 90% 
(Anderson 2010; National Research Council 1996) 
 
 
Table 16. Quarterly Feed Ingredient Prices (U.S. Dollars per Ton) 
($ /Ton) Quarter 1
a
 Quarter 2
b
 Quarter 3
c
 Quarter 4
d
 
Corn $133.22  $136.27  $131.60  $139.42  
Soybean Meal $302.74  $308.92  $360.00  $314.32  
Hay $127.70  $127.70  $127.70  $127.70  
a
 December 1-Feburary 28 
  c
 June 1-August 31 
b
 March 1-May 31
 
  
d
 August 31- November 30 
(USDA, AMS 2010a) 
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The cost of the ration ingredients were based on quarterly average prices for the U.S. and 
the Texas Triangle Region
3
.  The quarterly corn price was obtained from the 2008-2010 
monthly average corn prices for the Texas Triangle Region.  The quarterly soybean meal 
price was obtained from the Economic Research Service Oil Seed Outlook Report and is 
the quarterly average price for 2008-2010 US soybean meal.  Hay prices were obtained 
from Drovers CattleNetwork and were an average price of various hay types including 
alfalfa.  The average monthly Texas hay price over 27 months (September 2008 to 
December 2010) was used as the average price for hay for each quarter.  Table 16 shows 
the average quarterly feed prices used in calculating the feed costs.  
 
In order to calculate the amount of feed required throughout the quarantine length, the 
sum of pounds gained each month per animal for all age groups present during each 
month was calculated and divided by the age group rate of gain per unit feed; this 
calculated the tons of feed needed per month animal and this was multiplied by the 
animal population assuming the feedlot is at full capacity.  To obtain the amount of feed 
needed during the quarantine, the tons of feed needed per month were then multiplied by 
the monthly proportion of feedlot capacity utilization with marketings allowed for each 
initial outbreak month (Table 17).  The total tons of feed needed per month with 
marketings was then multiplied by the proportion of time the feedlot spent under 
quarantine during each month in order to obtain the average tons of feed needed during 
                                                 
3
 The Texas Triangle Region is a statistical reporting region of the USDA National 
Agricultural Statistics Service and is located in the Texas High Plains. It includes elevators 
in an area from Plainview to Canyon to Farwell and is comprised of Castro, Deaf Smith, 
Parmer, Randall, and Swisher counties in the Texas panhandle.  
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the quarantine.  The average tons of feed needed throughout the quarantine was then 
converted to a daily total. The average tons of feed needed per day was multiplied by the 
feed parts ration in order to obtain the tons of corn, soybean, and hay needed daily. Feed 
costs for corn were calculated by multiplying the tons of corn required throughout the 
quarantine by the average quarterly price of corn per ton.  Soybean meal and hay costs 
were calculated the same way as corn costs.  An implication of these assumptions is that 
feed needs decline as the quarantine goes on because the total number of cattle in the 
feedlot herd reduces by marketings that are not replaced by new placements.  
 
The number of feed deliveries and feed truck hauling costs were based on the 
assumption that an eight bin feed truck was used which has a hauling capacity of 23 
tons.  To calculate the number of feed deliveries the average tons of feed needed per day 
during the quarantine months were divided by the feed truck hauling capacity.  It was 
assumed that feed transportation costs were $110.75 per delivery; this was based on the 
Agricultural Marketing Services’ Grain Transportation 2010 Second Quarterly Update 
prices for the South Central US of $4.43 per mile for short distances of 25 miles or less.  
The feed transportation cost was calculated by multiplying the number of daily feed 
deliveries during each month by the cost per delivery.  Cleaning and disinfecting costs 
were adopted from Hagerman (2009) and were assumed to be $130 per feed truck 
delivery.  To calculate the feed truck cleaning and disinfecting cost the number of feed 
deliveries was multiplied by the cleaning and disinfecting cost per delivery.              
  
6
6
 
 
Table 17. Proportion of Large Texas Feedlot Capacity in any Given Month during Quarantine with Marketings Allowed 
Initial 
Outbreak 
Month 
Outbreak Month 
          
January February March April May June July August September October November December 
January 100% 82% 64% 46% 23% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
February 0% 100% 79% 56% 28% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
March 0% 0% 100% 78% 52% 26% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
April 0% 0% 0% 100% 73% 47% 22% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
May 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 71% 44% 21% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
June 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 69% 43% 20% 1% 0% 0% 
July 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 72% 48% 27% 1% 0% 
August 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 75% 54% 28% 1% 
September 22% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 84% 63% 43% 
October 42% 21% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 80% 61% 
November 62% 42% 22% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 81% 
December 82% 63% 45% 25% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
  
This table illustrates how the percentage of feedlot capacity would change during the duration of the quarantine given that marketings are allowed.    
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4.3.2 Marketing Costs 
Marketings of finished cattle were assumed to continue as normally scheduled two days 
after the initial quarantine was put into place.  The first two days that marketings were 
stopped were assumed to be caused by the initial stop movement ban.  The total number 
of head marketed was calculated by summing the number of average daily marketings 
over the quarantine length.  The number of average daily marketings over the quarantine 
was calculated by dividing the number of regular marketings per month by the days in 
each month the feedlot was quarantined; in the initial quarantine month two days were 
subtracted from number of days in that month to represent the initial halt movement 
order.  The number of cattle hauling trucks needed was estimated from the total number 
of cattle marketings during the quarantine.  According to the Master Cattle Transporter 
Guide (2008) a 48 foot cattle hauling trailer has a payload of 50,000 pounds.  The cattle 
loading density per load was calculated for each month and was based on the average 
weighted final weights of the finished steers and heifers.  The number of cattle hauling 
trucks needed per day was calculated by taking the average number of cattle marketed 
each day for a particular month and dividing it by the cattle loading density for the 
particular month.  The cost of cattle hauling was assumed to be $100 per load, which 
was the mode price in Texas for custom cattle hauling per load in 2008 (USDA, NASS 
2009).  Cleaning and disinfecting costs for cattle hauling trailers and trucks were 
assumed to be $170 per load, this cost was derived by increasing the $130 cleaning and 
disinfecting cost for feed trucks from Hagerman (2009) by 30 percent in order to account 
for the need of more extensive cleaning of cattle hauling trailers.  It is more expensive to 
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clean and disinfect cattle hauling trailers and trucks than feed trucks because more labor 
and supplies are required since the trailers have to be disinfected inside and out.   
 
Marketed cattle from quarantined feedlots were assumed to lose 50 percent of their 
market value to reflect the fact that quarantined animals would most likely not be 
eligible for higher value fresh and frozen beef products in the domestic market. This is 
due to efforts that will likely be undertaken to source fresh meat product from areas 
outside of the infected region and employ regionalization to speed trade recovery.  
However, marketings from uninfected, quarantined feedlots would likely be eligible for 
lower value cooked and canned meat products as well as non-human consumption 
products such as dog food.  It was assumed the 50 percent market value loss would be 
recouped by feedlots in the form of an indemnity payment from the government.  
Indemnity payments were calculated for each animal by multiplying the average final 
weight of marketed steers or heifers by 50 percent of the corresponding average monthly 
live weight price (Table 18).   The average monthly live weight price was calculated 
using the mandatory price reporting data for Texas and Oklahoma fed cattle; average 
2010 steer and heifer prices were used as the base along with a 3-year (2008-2010) 
monthly price index to incorporate seasonal variation in price. 
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Table 18. Monthly Average 2010 Texas and Oklahoma Steer and Heifer Live Weight Price 
(U.S. Dollars  per Pound) 
 Steer Heifers 
January 0.916 0.917 
February 0.928 0.929 
March 0.938 0.938 
April 0.965 0.965 
May 0.972 0.973 
June 0.947 0.948 
July 0.965 0.964 
August 0.979 0.979 
September 0.985 0.985 
October 0.967 0.968 
November 0.967 0.968 
December 0.954 0.954 
(USDA, AMS 2010b) 
 
 
4.3.2 Surveillance Costs 
The number of surveillance visits for each uninfected large feedlot was simulated by the 
AUSSPREAD model.  Surveillance costs were composed of labor, testing supplies, and 
equipment.  Surveillance cost assumptions were adopted from previous FMD costing 
work done by USDA APHIS for the North American Animal Disease Spread Model 
(NAADSM) (2009).  It was assumed that nine man hours were required per 1,000 head 
and that 17 percent of the herd was tested for FMD with polymerase chain reaction 
(PCR) assay tests during each surveillance visit.  The labor cost used was $34.87 per 
hour, which was the 2010 national average hourly base and overtime pay rates for 
government workers at pay grades five through 15 across steps one through 10.  PCR 
assay tests were assumed to cost $40 per test, testing costs include lab fees and were 
based on estimates provided by the USDA National Animal Health Laboratory Network.  
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It was assumed that each animal tested was tagged with a tamper evident radio 
frequency identification (RFID) tag for the ease of future identification and monitoring.  
The cost per RFID tag was assumed to be $2.93.  An additional $500 was added to each 
surveillance visit to account for miscellaneous costs such as personal protective 
equipment and cleaning and disinfecting of vehicles.    
 
4.4 Welfare Slaughter Strategy 
The welfare slaughter strategy assumed that strict movement restriction policies were 
imposed.  Under this case, no feed was allowed to be transported onto the quarantined, 
uninfected large feedlots and no cattle were allowed to be transported off. Instead, the 
cattle were assumed to be placed on subsistence rations until euthanasia crews were able 
to euthanize and dispose of the cattle through on-site burial.  It was assumed that 
officials decided to depopulate large feedlots as soon as resources were available 
because of the potential animal welfare conditions caused by the movement restrictions 
and quarantine zone.  It was assumed that cattle would be disposed of through onsite 
burial; land deprecation and burial site upkeep costs were not factored into the costs.  
This strategy does not promote continuity of business, but it does minimize movement of 
disease vectors thereby minimizing the risk of spread.  The minimized disease spread is 
not captured within this study, but is an important difference between the welfare 
slaughter strategy and unrestricted feed strategy.  
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Appraisal, euthanasia, disposal, cleaning and disinfecting costs were all adopted from 
previous USDA APHIS estimates developed for the NAADSM model (Table 19).  The 
cost estimates adopted from the NAADSM model (USDA, APHIS 2009) were based on 
total costs for the average feedlot herd size according to the 2007 Agricultural Census 
(322 head).  The total costs were converted to a per head cost and applied to the large 
feedlots.  The appraisal cost accounts for the labor required to count and appraise the 
cattle located on the feedlot.  The euthanasia cost is an estimate of the costs associated 
with euthanizing all the cattle on uninfected, quarantined large feedlots using a captive 
bolt method.  Specialized labor and equipment, like captive bolt operators and guns, are 
needed for the euthanasia portion of the welfare slaughter strategy.  Disposal cost is an 
estimated cost of burying cattle on the feedlot grounds, it is mainly composed of 
estimated cost for heavy equipment rentals and labor.  The cleaning and disinfecting cost 
include costs associated with cleaning and disinfecting vehicles and equipments used to 
euthanize and dispose of the cattle.   
 
 
Table 19. Welfare Slaughter Costs Adopted from NAADSM Assumptions 
Welfare Slaughter Costs $/Head 
Appraisal  0.58  
Euthanasia 50.00  
Disposal  31.00  
Cleaning and Disinfection 21.00  
(USDA, APHIS 2009) 
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Indemnity costs were calculated using an adjusted 2010 average monthly live weight 
price, which was calculated from mandatory price reporting data for Texas and 
Oklahoma fed cattle; average  2010 prices were used as the base along with a 3-year 
(2008-2010) monthly price index (USDA, AMS 2010b).  The purpose of indemnity 
payments is to provide an incentive for producers to comply with disease eradication 
efforts and movement restrictions orders.  Indemnity payments are not meant to cover all 
the costs incurred by producers, instead, they are meant to cover the lost market value of 
the depopulated herd.   
 
At the moment, indemnity payment policy does not currently have direct provisions for 
welfare slaughter; however, the Secretary of Agriculture has the power to grant 
indemnity payments for welfare slaughter in the state of emergency.  It was assumed that 
appraisals for indemnity payment amounts were performed by specialists visually 
inspecting and counting the head and analyzing feedlot records.  To obtain the placement 
indemnity and marketings indemnity costs, the incoming weights and final weights for 
steer and heifers was averaged and multiplied by the number of placements and 
marketings, respectively, and the corresponding monthly average 2010 adjusted live 
weight price.   
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In order to calculate the indemnity cost for cattle on feed the average weight of cattle on 
feed was estimated by taking the monthly difference between the weighted steer and 
heifer incoming weights and final weights and dividing by two, and then adding the 
weighted incoming weight.  The average weight of cattle on feed by month was then 
multiplied by the corresponding monthly average 2010 adjusted live weight price and 
the number of cattle on feed. 
 
4.5 Summary  
By combining the epidemiological data with the cost accounting models, differences in 
costs depending on the movement strategy and when an outbreak occurs for quarantined, 
uninfected large feedlots were highlighted.  The research was done in this way to inform 
policy makers of the implications of quarantine and movement restrictions for uninfected 
large feedlots in the THPR.   
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5. RESULTS 
Now I compare the total costs of the two policies: welfare slaughter and feed provision. 
In turn, the average total cost associated with an FMD outbreak motivated quarantine as 
it affected uninfected THPR large feedlots ranged between $16.2 million and $57.2 
million, depending on the movement policy, mitigation tactics used, and initial outbreak 
month.   
 
Average total cost for the unrestricted feed strategy ranged from $16.2 million to $30.9 
million depending on the detection delay and initial outbreak month.  For the welfare 
slaughter strategy, average total cost ranged from $39.8 million to $57.2 million 
depending on the mitigation tactic and initial outbreak month.  The unrestricted feed 
strategy was less costly than the welfare slaughter strategy for every initial outbreak 
month.     
75 
 
 
Early detection, late detection, enhanced surveillance, and regular surveillance were 
mitigation tactics used to compare and contrast the two movement strategies (Figure 2).  
The mitigation tactic costs are the average cost results from scenarios used in the 
AUSSPREAD model and in the previous Texas High Plains Study (Ward et al. 2009).  
Early detection (average of scenarios 17 and 37), assumed that FMD was discovered 
seven days after the initial infection and late detection mitigation tactic (average of 
scenarios 21 and 53), assumed that FMD was discovered 14 days after the initial 
infection in the epidemiological model.  Enhanced surveillance (average of scenarios 17 
and 21) assumed that suspect premises were visited four times per week, while regular 
surveillance (average of scenarios 37 and 53) assumed that suspect premises were visited 
two times per week.  Minimum, maximum, and average costs were compared for 
unrestricted feed and welfare slaughter strategies by the initial outbreak month. 
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Figure 2. Description of Scenarios and Mitigations Tactics Used to Analyze Welfare Slaughter and 
Unrestricted Feeds Strategies 
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5.1 AUSSPREAD Results 
The AUSSPREAD model simulated the status of herd types at the end of the quarantine, 
number of head in each herd, number of surveillance visits, and days under quarantine 
for each scenario 100 times.  The minimum, maximum, and average results from the 100 
simulated iterations for quarantined, uninfected large feedlots are presented in Table 20.  
On average, early detection quarantine length lasted six days longer than late detection.  
This result was surprising because the Texas High Plains Study (Ward et al. 2009) found 
that early detection significantly reduced the length of the quarantine when all herd types 
were examined, so this result may be the result of only examining a company feedlot 
initiation or may be the result of using a subset of the total scenarios.  Early detection 
reduced the number of uninfected quarantined head compared to late detection.  On 
average, late detection quarantined an additional 13,478 head compared to early 
detection.  The difference in the average number of head quarantined suggests that 
mitigation tactics that incorporate early detection result in smaller quarantine zones 
compared to mitigation tactics that incorporate late detection.  These results were 
consistent with what was expected, since Ward et al. (2009) found that early detection 
significantly reduced that number of infected and exposed head depopulated.  Enhanced 
surveillance reduced the average quarantine length on uninfected large feedlots by two 
days compared to regular surveillance.  
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Regular surveillance simulations had a larger range between the minimum and 
maximum number of uninfected quarantined head, but overall the average number of 
quarantined uninfected head was less than enhanced surveillance.  On average, enhanced 
surveillance quarantined an additional 2,934 head on uninfected large feedlots compared 
to regular surveillance.  These results suggest that in general, quarantine zones are larger 
when mitigation strategies incorporate enhanced surveillance instead of regular 
surveillance.  The Texas High Plains Study (Ward et al. 2009) found that enhanced 
surveillance did not significantly reduce the length of quarantine or the number of head 
depopulated.  The number of simulated surveillance visits for uninfected large feedlots 
were constant throughout the scenarios; this resulted because of underlying assumptions 
within the AUSSPREAD model.  In reality, one would expect there to be differences in 
the number of times each feedlot was visited between the enhanced and regular 
surveillance scenarios.  Consequently, in the cost accounting model surveillance costs 
differences are only realized through the differences in the number of head quarantined. 
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Table 20. Comparison of Quarantined Uninfected Large Feedlot AUSSPREAD Data Used in 
Costing Model 
 Early 
Detection 
Late 
Detection 
Enhanced 
Surveillance 
Regular 
Surveillance 
Herds Quarantined    
Minimum 1 1 1 1 
Maximum 6 8 7 7 
Mean 1.7 2.1 2.0 1.9 
Head Quarantined    
Minimum 7,600 6,400 7,200 6,800 
Maximum 165,840 263,600 211,600 217,840 
Mean 39,261 52,739 47,467 44,533 
Quarantine Length (Days)   
Minimum 90 68 77 80 
Maximum 109 109 109 109 
Mean 103 97 99 101 
Surveillance Visits    
Minimum 5 5 5 5 
Maximum 5 5 5 5 
Mean 5 5 5 5 
(Ward et al. 2009) 
 
 
5.2 Unrestricted Feed Strategy Compared to Welfare Slaughter Strategy  
Overall, the unrestricted feed strategy was less costly than the welfare slaughter strategy.  
The average cost difference between the two strategies ranged from $20.6 million, for 
outbreaks initiated in May, to $31.2 million for outbreaks initiated in November (Figure 
3).  For all mitigation tactics, outbreaks that began in May had the smallest average cost 
difference between unrestricted feed and welfare slaughter strategies, and outbreaks that 
began in November had the largest average cost difference.  On average there was a 71 
percent difference between the early detection unrestricted feed strategy total cost and 
the early detection welfare slaughter strategy total cost, with an average cost difference 
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totaling $21.5 million (Table 21).  The percent difference for total cost between the late 
detection unrestricted feed strategy and the late detection welfare slaughter strategy 
averaged 76 percent, with an average cost difference totaling $30.4 million (Table 22).  
The percent difference for total cost between the regular surveillance unrestricted feed 
strategy and the regular surveillance welfare slaughter strategy averaged 73 percent for 
all outbreak months, with an average cost difference equaling $25 million (Table 23).  
On average the percent difference for total cost for the enhanced surveillance 
unrestricted feed strategy and the enhanced surveillance welfare slaughter strategy was 
74 percent, with an average cost difference totaling $26.9 million (Table 24).  Feeding 
quarantined uninfected cattle on large feedlots and indemnifying producers for 50 
percent of their value is less expensive compared to euthanizing the cattle and 
indemnifying producers for 100 percent of their value. 
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Figure 3. Average Total Cost for Unrestricted Feed Strategies and Welfare Slaughter 
Strategies 
 
 
Table 21. Early Detection Average Total Cost Comparison (Million U.S. Dollars) 
Outbreak 
Month 
Welfare 
Slaughter 
Unrestricted 
Feed 
Difference Percent 
Difference 
January  40.01 18.39 21.62 74% 
February 41.97 20.19 21.77 70% 
March 39.82 21.51 18.32 60% 
April 40.16 23.27 16.89 53% 
May 41.14 24.31 16.82 51% 
June 41.32 23.68 17.64 54% 
July 42.13 21.61 20.52 64% 
August 42.28 18.94 23.34 76% 
September 41.58 17.33 24.25 82% 
October 42.24 16.16 26.07 89% 
November 42.57 16.57 26.00 88% 
December 41.85 17.16 24.69 84% 
Average 
All Months 
41.42 19.93 21.49 71% 
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Table 22. Late Detection Average Total Cost Comparison (Million U.S. Dollars) 
Outbreak 
Month 
Welfare 
Slaughter 
Unrestricted 
Feed 
Difference Percent 
Difference 
January  53.74 23.14 30.60 80% 
February 56.37 25.43 30.94 76% 
March 53.50 26.99 26.50 66% 
April 53.94 29.34 24.60 59% 
May 55.26 30.88 24.38 57% 
June 55.50 30.30 25.20 59% 
July 56.60 27.83 28.76 68% 
August 56.80 24.24 32.55 80% 
September 55.85 22.03 33.82 87% 
October 56.74 20.58 36.16 94% 
November 57.18 20.88 36.30 93% 
December 56.21 21.58 34.63 89% 
Average 
All Months 
55.64 25.27 30.37 76% 
 
 
Table 23. Regular Surveillance Average Total Cost Comparison (Million U.S. Dollars) 
Outbreak 
Month 
Welfare 
Slaughter 
Unrestricted 
Feed 
Difference Percent 
Difference 
January  45.38 20.25 25.13 77% 
February 47.60 22.24 25.36 73% 
March 45.17 23.65 21.52 63% 
April 45.55 25.63 19.92 56% 
May 46.66 26.86 19.80 54% 
June 46.87 26.24 20.63 56% 
July 47.79 24.02 23.77 66% 
August 47.96 21.02 26.94 78% 
September 47.16 19.16 28.01 84% 
October 47.91 17.88 30.03 91% 
November 48.28 18.27 30.01 90% 
December 47.47 18.88 28.59 86% 
Average 
All Months 
46.98 22.01 24.98 73% 
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Table 24. Enhanced Surveillance Cost Comparison (Million U.S. Dollars) 
Outbreak 
Month 
Welfare 
Slaughter 
Unrestricted 
Feed 
Difference Percent 
Difference 
January  48.37 21.28 27.09 78% 
February 50.74 23.38 27.36 74% 
March 48.15 24.85 23.30 64% 
April 48.55 26.98 21.57 57% 
May 49.73 28.33 21.41 55% 
June 49.96 27.74 22.22 57% 
July 50.94 25.42 25.51 67% 
August 51.12 22.17 28.95 79% 
September 50.27 20.21 30.06 85% 
October 51.07 18.86 32.20 92% 
November 51.46 19.17 32.29 91% 
December 50.59 19.86 30.73 87% 
Average 
All Months 
50.08 23.19 26.89 74% 
 
 
5.3 Unrestricted Feed Strategy  
The overall average total cost for the unrestricted feed strategy was $22.6 million.  Total 
cost included indemnity payments, hauling costs for marketed cattle, cleaning and 
disinfection of cattle hauling trucks, feed costs, hauling costs for feed, cleaning and 
disinfecting of feed trucks, and surveillance visits costs.  Early detection was the most 
economical mitigation tactic, with an average total cost of $19.9 million.  Late detection 
was most expensive mitigation tactic, with an average total cost of $25.3 million.  
Regular surveillance was slightly less costly than enhanced surveillance, with average 
total costs of $22 million and $23.2 million, respectively.  
 
The cost differences between the mitigation tactics were mainly driven by the number of 
uninfected cattle quarantined on the feedlots; early detection had the smallest number of 
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head quarantined and was the most economically desirable outcome, while late detection 
had the largest number of head quarantined and was the most expensive.  The two main 
input drivers of the unrestricted feed costing model were the number of head quarantined 
and the quarantine length.  The three most expensive components of average total cost 
were indemnity payments, feed cost, and surveillance visits.  The largest cost 
component, regardless of when the outbreak initiated, was the indemnity payment 
amount.  It was assumed that indemnity payments were equal to 50 percent of market 
value before the outbreak began. 
 
5.3.1 Unrestricted Feed Strategy Seasonal Results 
The results illustrated that costs for uninfected feedlots quarantined during an FMD 
outbreak will vary depending on the time of year the outbreak occurs.  Based on mean 
average total cost, the month of May was the most expensive month for an outbreak to 
begin and October was the least expensive month for an outbreak to begin.  Figure 4 
presents the average total cost by initial outbreak month for all unrestricted feed strategy 
mitigation tactics. 
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Figure 4. Average Total Cost for Unrestricted Feed Strategy Mitigation Tactics by Outbreak Month 
 
 
Depending on the initial outbreak month, indemnity payment costs ranged from 
approximately 66 percent to 76 percent of average total cost, feed costs ranged from 15 
percent to 22 percent of average total cost, surveillance visit costs ranged from 6 percent 
to 10 percent of average total cost, and hauling costs and cleaning and disinfecting costs 
for cattle hauling and feed trucks were consistently less than or close to one percent of 
the average total costs depending on the initial outbreak month (Table 25 and Figure 5).  
The cost component percentages of total cost differed less than one percent between all 
mitigation tactics for each initial outbreak months.  Tables 26-29 show the minimum, 
maximum, and average costs for all mitigation tactic. 
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Table 25. Average Percentage of Average Total Cost for Cost Components by Initial Outbreak 
Month for all Unrestricted Feed Mitigation Tactics 
In
it
ia
l 
O
u
tb
re
ak
 
M
o
n
th
 
In
d
e
m
n
it
y 
P
ay
m
e
n
ts
 
C
at
tl
e
 T
ru
ck
 
D
is
in
fe
ct
in
g 
C
at
tl
e
 T
ru
ck
 
H
au
lin
g 
 Fe
e
d
 C
o
st
 
Fe
e
d
 T
ru
ck
 
D
is
in
fe
ct
in
g 
Fe
e
d
 T
ru
ck
 
H
au
lin
g 
Su
rv
e
ill
an
ce
 
V
is
it
s 
January 68.7% 0.6% 0.4% 20.5% 0.8% 0.7% 8.4% 
February 70.7% 0.6% 0.4% 19.4% 0.8% 0.6% 7.7% 
March 71.1% 0.6% 0.4% 19.3% 0.8% 0.7% 7.2% 
April 74.7% 0.6% 0.4% 16.6% 0.7% 0.6% 6.6% 
May 76.3% 0.6% 0.4% 15.3% 0.6% 0.5% 6.3% 
June 76.4% 0.6% 0.4% 15.1% 0.6% 0.5% 6.5% 
July 73.4% 0.6% 0.4% 17.4% 0.7% 0.6% 7.1% 
August 69.7% 0.5% 0.4% 19.9% 0.8% 0.7% 8.1% 
September 66.7% 0.5% 0.4% 22.0% 0.9% 0.7% 8.9% 
October 66.4% 0.5% 0.4% 21.6% 0.9% 0.7% 9.5% 
November 67.9% 0.5% 0.4% 20.4% 0.8% 0.7% 9.3% 
December 68.8% 0.6% 0.4% 19.8% 0.8% 0.7% 9.0% 
Average 70.90% 0.57% 0.40% 18.94% 0.77% 0.64% 7.88% 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Average Cost Components Percentage of Average Total Cost by Initial Outbreak Month 
for all Unrestricted Feed Mitigation Tactics 
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Table 26. Unrestricted Feed Early Detection FMD Outbreak Costs for Quarantined Uninfected Large Feedlots 
Costs 
(Thousand US $) 
January February March April May June July August September October November December 
Indemnity Payment            
Minimum 2,250 2,526 2,681 3,083 3,367 3,342 2,965 2,446 2,122 1,971 1,991 2,112 
Maximum  55,165 62,677 67,514 75,865 80,087 77,579 67,846 57,013 50,040 46,448 49,629 51,422 
Average 12,694 14,379 15,430 17,491 18,638 18,157 15,913 13,270 11,629 10,803 11,334 11,870 
Feed             
Minimum 688 721 763 711 690 664 699 698 704 646 619 621 
Maximum  16,011 16,390 17,362 16,085 15,636 15,048 15,855 15,861 16,106 14,774 14,256 14,487 
Average 3,748 3,854 4,087 3,788 3,682 3,545 3,733 3,733 3,784 3,471 3,342 3,387 
Feed Truck Hauling            
Minimum 28 25 28 28 28 27 27 28 27 25 25 22 
Maximum  547 545 582 545 529 505 524 530 538 504 488 494 
Average 130 129 138 129 126 121 126 127 127 119 116 116 
Feed Truck Cleaning/Disinfecting          
Minimum 33 29 33 33 33 32 32 33 32 30 29 26 
Maximum  642 640 684 639 622 593 615 623 631 592 573 579 
Average 153 152 162 152 148 142 147 149 150 140 136 137 
Cattle Hauling             
Minimum 15 18 18 18 18 18 17 14 11 9 9 12 
Maximum  258 285 300 333 352 344 304 256 228 214 228 241 
Average 62 69 72 79 83 81 72 61 54 50 54 58 
Cattle Truck Cleaning/Disinfecting          
Minimum 25 30 30 30 30 30 28 24 19 15 15 20 
Maximum  439 484 510 565 598 585 516 435 387 363 387 410 
Average 105 117 122 135 142 139 123 104 92 86 91 98 
Surveillance            
Minimum 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 
Maximum  6,315 6,315 6,315 6,315 6,315 6,315 6,315 6,315 6,315 6,315 6,315 6,315 
Average 1,495 1,495 1,495 1,495 1,495 1,495 1,495 1,495 1,495 1,495 1,495 1,495 
Total             
Minimum 3,329 3,638 3,843 4,193 4,455 4,403 4,059 3,532 3,204 2,985 2,979 3,103 
Maximum  79,378 87,337 93,266 100,346 104,139 100,970 91,975 81,033 74,244 69,209 71,875 73,948 
Average 18,387 20,194 21,506 23,269 24,315 23,680 21,609 18,938 17,330 16,164 16,569 17,161 
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Table 27. Unrestricted Feed Late Detection FMD Outbreak Costs for Quarantined Uninfected Large Feedlots 
Costs  
(Thousand US $) 
January February March April May June July August September October November December 
Indemnity Payment            
Minimum 1,616 1,793 1,877 2,193 2,448 2,482 2,259 1,850 1,529 1,433 1,664 1,478 
Maximum  79,384 89,643 95,727 109,092 117,305 115,293 101,809 84,480 73,219 68,087 70,933 73,929 
Average 15,810 17,845 19,057 21,770 23,441 23,063 20,371 16,827 14,613 13,591 14,082 14,762 
Feed             
Minimum 507 563 604 570 553 531 558 556 545 504 519 460 
Maximum  23,779 24,876 26,430 24,602 23,895 23,001 24,206 24,180 24,337 22,358 21,448 21,497 
Average 4,760 4,986 5,301 4,933 4,790 4,614 4,852 4,846 4,876 4,477 4,288 4,295 
Feed Truck Hauling            
Minimum 20 22 24 24 22 21 21 22 21 21 22 19 
Maximum  804 823 878 816 799 758 786 800 801 743 719 720 
Average 164 167 179 168 163 155 161 163 163 152 147 148 
Feed Truck Cleaning/Disinfecting          
Minimum 23 26 28 28 25 24 24 25 24 24 25 22 
Maximum  944 966 1,031 958 938 889 923 939 940 872 844 845 
Average 192 196 211 197 191 182 189 191 192 179 173 173 
Cattle Hauling             
Minimum 9 10 11 14 15 15 14 11 8 8 9 8 
Maximum  366 401 423 474 507 501 445 374 325 304 321 341 
Average 76 84 88 99 105 104 92 77 67 63 66 71 
Cattle Truck Cleaning/Disinfecting          
Minimum 15 17 18 23 26 26 23 18 13 13 15 14 
Maximum  622 682 719 806 861 851 757 635 553 517 546 580 
Average 129 143 150 168 179 176 157 131 114 107 112 121 
Surveillance            
Minimum 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 
Maximum  10,036 10,036 10,036 10,036 10,036 10,036 10,036 10,036 10,036 10,036 10,036 10,036 
Average 2,008 2,008 2,008 2,008 2,008 2,008 2,008 2,008 2,008 2,008 2,008 2,008 
Total             
Minimum 2,434 2,675 2,805 3,096 3,333 3,343 3,144 2,725 2,383 2,247 2,498 2,246 
Maximum  115,935 127,429 135,244 146,785 154,341 151,329 138,962 121,443 110,211 102,918 104,848 107,947 
Average 23,139 25,430 26,994 29,342 30,877 30,303 27,831 24,244 22,034 20,578 20,877 21,578 
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Table 28. Unrestricted Feed Regular Surveillance FMD Outbreak Costs for Quarantined Uninfected Large Feedlots 
Costs 
 (Thousand US $) 
January February March April May June July August September October November December 
Indemnity Payment            
Minimum 1,962 2,200 2,331 2,686 2,944 2,929 2,599 2,152 1,843 1,717 1,744 1,829 
Maximum  72,008 81,750 87,983 99,061 104,801 101,654 88,936 74,597 65,452 60,765 64,665 67,171 
Average 13,918 15,743 16,857 19,160 20,504 20,056 17,637 14,670 12,789 11,888 12,430 12,994 
Feed             
Minimum 600 630 669 625 607 583 614 614 616 567 545 544 
Maximum  20,980 21,498 22,778 21,105 20,515 19,746 20,802 20,807 21,120 19,374 18,686 18,978 
Average 4,139 4,290 4,553 4,229 4,109 3,956 4,164 4,162 4,205 3,859 3,710 3,740 
Feed Truck Hauling            
Minimum 23 24 26 26 24 23 23 24 23 23 22 21 
Maximum  711 714 760 709 691 658 682 692 696 655 633 641 
Average 143 144 154 144 141 134 139 141 141 132 128 129 
Feed Truck Cleaning/Disinfecting          
Minimum 27 28 30 30 28 27 27 28 27 27 26 25 
Maximum  835 838 892 832 811 773 801 813 817 769 743 753 
Average 168 169 181 169 165 158 163 165 166 155 150 151 
Cattle Hauling             
Minimum 12 13 14 16 17 17 15 12 9 9 9 10 
Maximum  332 365 386 432 458 449 393 331 294 277 295 312 
Average 67 75 78 87 92 90 80 67 59 55 59 63 
Cattle Truck Cleaning/Disinfecting          
Minimum 20 22 24 27 29 29 26 21 16 15 15 17 
Maximum  564 621 657 734 779 762 668 562 500 471 502 530 
Average 114 127 133 148 156 154 136 114 100 94 100 107 
Surveillance            
Minimum 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 
Maximum  8,294 8,294 8,294 8,294 8,294 8,294 8,294 8,294 8,294 8,294 8,294 8,294 
Average 1,696 1,696 1,696 1,696 1,696 1,696 1,696 1,696 1,696 1,696 1,696 1,696 
Total             
Minimum 2,903 3,177 3,353 3,668 3,908 3,868 3,565 3,109 2,794 2,616 2,620 2,706 
Maximum  103,724 114,080 121,751 131,166 136,349 132,336 120,577 106,097 97,174 90,606 93,819 96,679 
Average 20,246 22,244 23,653 25,634 26,862 26,244 24,016 21,016 19,157 17,880 18,273 18,879 
   
9
0
 
Table 29. Unrestricted Feed Enhanced Surveillance FMD Outbreak Costs for Quarantined Uninfected Large Feedlots 
Costs 
(Thousand US $) 
January February March April May June July August September October November December 
Indemnity Payment            
Minimum 1,903 2,119 2,227 2,591 2,871 2,894 2,626 2,144 1,808 1,687 1,911 1,761 
Maximum  62,541 70,571 75,257 85,895 92,590 91,219 80,718 66,895 57,807 53,770 55,898 58,180 
Average 14,586 16,481 17,629 20,100 21,576 21,164 18,647 15,427 13,453 12,507 12,986 13,639 
Feed             
Minimum 595 654 698 656 636 612 643 640 633 583 593 537 
Maximum  18,809 19,768 21,014 19,582 19,016 18,303 19,259 19,233 19,322 17,758 17,017 17,006 
Average 4,369 4,550 4,834 4,492 4,363 4,204 4,421 4,417 4,455 4,089 3,921 3,942 
Feed Truck Hauling            
Minimum 25 23 26 26 26 25 25 26 25 23 24 20 
Maximum  640 655 701 653 638 605 628 638 642 592 573 572 
Average 150 153 164 153 149 142 147 149 149 139 135 135 
Feed Truck Cleaning/Disinfecting          
Minimum 29 27 31 30 30 29 29 30 29 27 28 23 
Maximum  751 769 822 766 749 710 738 749 754 695 673 671 
Average 177 179 192 179 174 167 173 175 175 163 159 159 
Cattle Hauling             
Minimum 12 14 14 16 16 16 15 12 9 8 9 10 
Maximum  293 321 336 375 400 397 356 299 259 241 254 271 
Average 70 78 82 91 96 95 85 71 62 58 61 66 
Cattle Truck Cleaning/Disinfecting          
Minimum 18 20 21 26 26 26 23 18 13 13 18 15 
Maximum  498 545 572 637 681 674 604 508 440 409 431 460 
Average 120 133 139 155 164 161 144 120 105 98 104 112 
Surveillance            
Minimum 275 275 275 275 275 275 275 275 275 275 275 275 
Maximum  8,057 8,057 8,057 8,057 8,057 8,057 8,057 8,057 8,057 8,057 8,057 8,057 
Average 1,808 1,808 1,808 1,808 1,808 1,808 1,808 1,808 1,808 1,808 1,808 1,808 
Total             
Minimum 2,860 3,135 3,295 3,621 3,880 3,877 3,638 3,148 2,794 2,617 2,857 2,642 
Maximum  91,589 100,686 106,759 115,965 122,131 119,964 110,360 96,379 87,280 81,521 82,903 85,216 
Average 21,280 23,381 24,847 26,978 28,329 27,740 25,425 22,166 20,207 18,861 19,173 19,860 
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5.3.1.1 Marketing Costs 
Indemnity payments, cattle hauling, and cattle truck cleaning and disinfecting costs were 
most expensive for May initiated outbreaks because May initiated outbreaks marketed a 
greater number of finish cattle throughout the quarantine length than outbreaks initiated 
in other months.  It was assumed that two days after the quarantine was established 
finished cattle were allowed to be marketed.  Indemnity payment amounts for May 
initiated outbreaks averaged $18.6 million, $23.4 million, $20.5 million, and $21.6 
million for early detection, late detection, regular surveillance, and enhanced 
surveillance, respectively.  The transportation and cleaning and disinfecting costs 
associated with marketing cattle were relatively small when compared to the other cost 
components.  The combined average cost of hauling cattle and cleaning and disinfecting 
cattle trucks for May initiated outbreaks was less than $300,000 for all mitigation tactics.  
Early detection marketed an average of 30,798 head throughout May initiated outbreaks, 
while late detection marketed 38,744 head.  Regular surveillance and enhanced 
surveillance marketed 33,883 head and 35,659 head on average for May initiated 
outbreaks, respectively.  For outbreaks that began in May, early detection required 833 
cattle truckloads to haul the finished cattle to the packing plant for harvest over the 
quarantine length, while late detection required 1,051 cattle truckloads.  Regular 
surveillance required 919 cattle truckloads and enhanced surveillance required 964 cattle 
truckloads for May initiated outbreaks.  June and April initiated outbreaks marketed 
slightly smaller numbers of head than May initiated outbreaks and were the second and 
third most expensive months to have an outbreak begin. 
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October initiated outbreaks marketed the smallest number of cattle throughout the 
quarantine length; therefore, indemnity payments, cattle hauling, and cattle truck 
cleaning and disinfecting costs were the lowest for October initiated outbreaks.  Early 
detection, late detection, regular surveillance, and enhanced surveillance each marketed 
an average of 18,914 head, 23,763 head, 20,802 head, and 21,876 head, respectively, for 
October initiated outbreaks.  Early detection and late detection indemnity payments for 
October initiated outbreaks had a $2.8 million difference, with indemnity payment 
amounts averaging $10.8 million and $13.6 million, respectively.  Regular surveillance 
and enhanced surveillance indemnity payments had a $600,000 difference, with 
indemnity payments averaging $11.9 million and $12.5 million, respectively.  For 
October initiated outbreaks early detection required 503 cattle truckloads, late detection 
required 629 cattle truckloads, regular surveillance required 555 cattle truckloads, and 
enhanced surveillance required 919 cattle truckloads in order to haul the finished cattle 
to nearby packing plants for harvest.  For all mitigation tactics, November and December 
initiated outbreaks marketed fewer than three thousand additional head than October 
initiated outbreaks are were the second and third least expensive months to have 
outbreaks begin.      
 
5.3.1.2 Feeding Costs 
Outbreaks that began in March required the most feed and had the largest feed costs of 
all monthly outbreaks.  It was assumed that feed deliveries for quarantined large 
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uninfected feedlots started five days after the quarantine was established.  For March 
initiated outbreaks, early detection required approximately 26,905 tons of feedstuff 
throughout the quarantine, with an average total feed cost of $4.1 million.  Late detection 
required approximately 34,904 tons of feedstuff for March initiated outbreaks, and total 
feed cost averaged $5.3 million.  Regular surveillance required 29,978 tons of feedstuff, 
while; enhanced surveillance required 34,904 tons of feedstuff for March initiated 
outbreaks.  Average total feed cost for regular surveillance and enhanced surveillance 
was $4.6 million and $4.8 million for outbreaks that began in March, respectively.  The 
number of total feed deliveries required throughout March initiated outbreaks ranged 
from 1,249 feed truck deliveries, for early detection, to 1,620 feed truck deliveries, for 
late detection.  Early detection and late detection mitigation tactics required an average 
of 13 and 18 feed truck deliveries per day, respectively, for March initiated outbreaks.  
Regular surveillance required 1,392 feed truck deliveries total or 15 feed truck deliveries 
per day throughout March initiated outbreaks.  Enhanced surveillance required 1,477 
feed truck deliveries total or 16 feed delivers per day for outbreaks that began in March.  
For March initiated outbreaks, the average cleaning and disinfecting cost for feed trucks 
totaled $162,000 for early detection, $211,000 for late detection, $181,000 for regular 
surveillance, and $192,000 for enhanced surveillance.  Feed truck-hauling costs ranged 
from $138,000 to $179,000 for early detection and late detection, respectively, for 
March initiated outbreaks.  Regular surveillance and enhanced surveillance feed truck-
hauling costs averaged $154,000 and $164,000, respectively.  April and February 
initiated outbreaks were slightly less costly than March initiated outbreaks and on 
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average were second and third most expensive months for outbreaks to take place, 
respectively.   
 
Feed and feed delivery associated costs were the least expensive for November initiated 
outbreaks and most expensive for March initiated outbreaks.  For November initiated 
outbreaks the cost of feed averaged $3.3 million, $4.3 million, $3.7 million, and $3.9 
million for early detection, late detection, regular surveillance, and enhanced 
surveillance mitigation tactics, respectively.  Corn was the most expensive feedstuff 
ingredient, followed by soybean meal and then hay.  For November initiated outbreaks, 
63 percent of the total feed cost was the cost of corn; soybean meal and hay accounted 
for 20 percent and 17 percent of average total feed cost, respectively.  The number of 
feed truck deliveries required for November initiated outbreaks ranged between 1,049 
deliveries for early detection, and 1,329 deliveries for late detection.  Regular 
surveillance required 1,157 feed truck deliveries and enhanced surveillance required 
1,220 deliveries for outbreaks that began in November.  The average number of feed 
deliveries needed per day for November initiated outbreaks ranged from 11 deliveries to 
15 deliveries, for early and late detection, respectively.  Regular surveillance and 
enhanced surveillance both required an average of 13 feed deliveries per day over the 
duration of the quarantine for November initiated outbreaks.  Early detection required 
22,125 tons of feedstuff throughout the quarantine length, while late detection required 
28,366 tons of feedstuff.  Regular surveillance required 24,549 tons of feedstuff 
throughout the quarantine length, while enhanced surveillance required 25,941 tons of 
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feedstuff.  The cleaning and disinfecting cost for feed trucks and feed transportation cost 
for early detection averaged $136,000 and $116,000 respectively.  Late detection 
cleaning and disinfecting cost for feed trucks averaged $173,000, and feed transportation 
cost averaged $147,000 for November initiated outbreaks.  Regular surveillance and 
enhanced surveillance cleaning and disinfecting cost for feed truck averaged $150,000 
and $159,000, while transportation costs averaged $128,000 and $135,000 respectively.  
Feeding costs for December and October initiated outbreaks were slightly more 
expensive than November initiated outbreaks but were the second and third least 
expensive months, respectively, for an outbreak to begin in terms of feeding costs.   
 
5.3.1.3 Surveillance Cost 
In the AUSSPREAD model every quarantined large uninfected feedlot was visited five 
times regardless of the mitigation tactic and initial outbreak month.  Therefore, the 
surveillance costs for each mitigation tactic were constant for each initial outbreak 
month.  Surveillance cost was dependent on the number of head quarantined.  Labor, 
supplies, and equipment costs for FMD surveillance were calculated within the 
surveillance cost.  Early detection had the lowest average surveillance cost of $1.5 
million, since it quarantined the lowest number of head on average.  Late detection had 
the highest average surveillance cost of $2 million, followed by enhanced surveillance 
with an average surveillance cost of $1.8 million, and regular surveillance with an 
average surveillance cost of $1.7 million.  The average cost of one surveillance visit 
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ranged between $300,000 and $403,000.  Surveillance cost were bases entirely on the 
number of head present when the quarantine was established.  
 
5.4 Welfare Slaughter Strategy        
The overall average total cost for the welfare slaughter strategy was $48.5 million; this 
can be considered the amount of losses expected if no quarantine policies are 
established.  Total cost included surveillance, appraisal, euthanasia, disposal, cleaning 
and disinfecting, and indemnity payments for placements, cattle on feed, and marketings.  
Similar to the unrestricted feed strategy, early detection was the most economical 
mitigation tactic for the welfare slaughter strategy, with an average total cost of $41.4 
million.  Late detection was most expensive mitigation tactic, with an average total cost 
of $55.6 million.  Regular surveillance was approximately $3.1 million less costly than 
enhanced surveillance, with average total costs of $47 million and $50.1 million, 
respectively. 
 
The cost differences between the mitigation tactics were driven by the number of 
uninfected cattle quarantined on the feedlots; early detection had the smallest number of 
head quarantined and was the most economically desirable outcome, while late detection 
had the largest number of head quarantine and was the most expensive.  Quarantine 
length did not influence costs in the welfare slaughter model because it was assumed that 
quarantined uninfected cattle would be euthanized as quickly as possible, before feed 
supplies ran out.  The three most expensive components of average total cost were 
97 
 
  
9
7
 
indemnity payments, euthanasia, and disposal.  The largest cost component was the 
indemnity payment amount, which on average accounted for approximately 90 percent 
of total cost.  Euthanasia accounted for approximately 5 percent of total cost and 
disposal accounted for 3 percent of total cost; while, cleaning and disinfecting, appraisal, 
and surveillance combined accounted for approximately 3 percent of total cost on 
average (Table 30).  Indemnity payments for cattle on feed account for 57 percent of 
total cost  and 63 percent of total indemnity payments on average, while indemnity 
payments for marketings and placements accounted for 20 percent and 12 percent of 
total cost on average and 23 percent and 14 percent of total indemnity payments, 
respectively (Table 31).  It was assumed that indemnity payments were equal to 100 
percent of market value before the outbreak began and were calculated based on the 
monthly herd mixture and average cattle weight. 
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Table 30. Average Percentage of Average Total Cost for Cost Components by Initial Outbreak 
Month for all Welfare Slaughter Mitigation Tactics 
Initial 
Outbreak 
Month 
 
Surveillance 
Visit 
 
Appraisal 
 
Euthanasia 
 
Disposal 
 
Cleaning and 
Disinfecting 
Total 
Indemnity 
Payments 
January 0.7% 0.1% 4.9% 3.0% 2.1% 89.2% 
February 0.7% 0.1% 4.7% 2.9% 2.0% 89.7% 
March 0.8% 0.1% 4.9% 3.1% 2.1% 89.1% 
April 0.7% 0.1% 4.9% 3.0% 2.1% 89.2% 
May 0.7% 0.1% 4.8% 3.0% 2.0% 89.5% 
June 0.7% 0.1% 4.8% 2.9% 2.0% 89.5% 
July 0.7% 0.1% 4.7% 2.9% 2.0% 89.7% 
August 0.7% 0.1% 4.6% 2.9% 1.9% 89.8% 
September 0.7% 0.1% 4.7% 2.9% 2.0% 89.6% 
October 0.7% 0.1% 4.6% 2.9% 2.0% 89.8% 
November 0.7% 0.1% 4.6% 2.9% 1.9% 89.8% 
December 0.7% 0.1% 4.7% 2.9% 2.0% 89.7% 
Average 0.7% 0.1% 4.7% 2.9% 2.0% 89.5% 
 
 
Table 31. Percent of Average Total Cost and Total Indemnity Payments for Placements, Cattle on 
Feed, and Marketings by Initial Outbreak Month for all Welfare Slaughter Mitigation Tactics 
 Placement Indemnity 
Payments 
Cattle on Feed 
Indemnity Payments 
Marketings Indemnity 
Payments 
Initial Outbreak 
Month 
% Total 
Cost 
% Indemnity 
Total 
% Total 
Cost 
% Indemnity 
Total 
% Total 
Cost 
% Indemnity 
Total 
January 13.0% 14.6% 60.5% 67.8% 15.7% 17.6% 
February 0.0% 0.0% 70.5% 78.6% 19.2% 21.4% 
March 14.3% 16.0% 55.8% 62.6% 19.0% 21.4% 
April 11.3% 12.7% 57.8% 64.8% 20.1% 22.5% 
May 10.5% 11.7% 54.6% 61.1% 24.4% 27.3% 
June 9.0% 10.1% 53.1% 59.3% 27.4% 30.6% 
July 13.2% 14.7% 48.7% 54.3% 27.8% 31.0% 
August 14.4% 16.0% 51.9% 57.7% 23.4% 26.1% 
September 25.4% 28.3% 45.5% 50.7% 18.8% 20.9% 
October 11.8% 13.1% 63.8% 71.1% 14.2% 15.9% 
November 12.4% 13.8% 59.6% 66.4% 17.8% 19.8% 
December 13.8% 15.3% 58.8% 65.6% 17.1% 19.1% 
Average 12.4% 13.9% 56.7% 63.3% 20.4% 22.8% 
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5.4.1 Welfare Slaughter Strategy Seasonal Results 
Based on average total cost, the month of November was the most expensive month for 
an outbreak to begin and March was the least expensive month for an outbreak to begin.  
Depending on the initial outbreak month, average total cost for early detection ranged 
from $39.8 million, for March initiated outbreaks, to $42.6 million, for October initiated 
outbreaks.  Average total cost for regular surveillance ranged from $45.17 million to 
$48.3 million, while, enhanced surveillance average total cost ranged from $48.2 million 
to $51.5 million and average total cost for late detection ranged from $53.5 million to 
$57.2 million.  Figure 6 compares the average total cost of mitigation tactics for each 
initial outbreak month. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Average Total Cost for Welfare Slaughter Strategy Mitigation Tactics by Initial Outbreak 
Month 
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Outbreaks that begun in November were the most expensive followed by October and 
February initiated outbreaks.  The percent difference between average total cost for 
November and October initiated outbreaks was less than one percent. In addition, the 
percent difference between November and February initiated outbreaks was only slightly 
more than one percent.  March initiated outbreaks were the least expensive followed by 
January and April initiated outbreaks.  The percent difference between average total cost 
for March and January initiated outbreaks and March and April initiated outbreaks were 
both less than one percent.  The percent difference for average total cost between 
November and March initiated outbreaks was approximately 7 percent for all mitigation 
tactics.  Tables 32-35 present the minimum, maximum, and average total costs for all 
cost components by initial outbreak month for all welfare slaughter strategy mitigation 
tactics.   
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Table 32. Welfare Slaughter Early Detection FMD Outbreak Costs for Quarantined Uninfected Large Feedlots 
Costs 
(Thousand US $) 
January February March April May June July August September October November December 
Surveillance             
Minimum 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Maximum 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 
Average 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 
Appraisal             
Minimum 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Maximum 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Average 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Euthanasia             
Minimum 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 
Maximum 8,292 8,292 8,292 8,292 8,292 8,292 8,292 8,292 8,292 8,292 8,292 8,292 
Average 1,963 1,963 1,963 1,963 1,963 1,963 1,963 1,963 1,963 1,963 1,963 1,963 
Disposal             
Minimum 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 
Maximum 5,141 5,141 5,141 5,141 5,141 5,141 5,141 5,141 5,141 5,141 5,141 5,141 
Average 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 
C&D             
Minimum 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 
Maximum 3,483 3,483 3,483 3,483 3,483 3,483 3,483 3,483 3,483 3,483 3,483 3,483 
Average 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 
Indemnity Payments            
Minimum 6,907 7,286 6,871 6,936 7,126 7,161 7,318 7,347 7,211 7,339 7,402 7,263 
Maximum 150,714 158,992 149,941 151,347 155,486 156,260 159,690 160,325 157,360 160,139 161,527 158,487 
Average 35,680 37,640 35,497 35,830 36,810 36,993 37,805 37,956 37,254 37,911 38,240 37,520 
Total             
Minimum 7,745 8,124 7,709 7,774 7,963 7,999 8,156 8,185 8,049 8,177 8,240 8,101 
Maximum 168,992 177,269 168,218 169,624 173,763 174,538 177,967 178,602 175,638 178,416 179,804 176,764 
Average 40,007 41,967 39,824 40,157 41,137 41,320 42,132 42,283 41,581 42,239 42,567 41,847 
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Table 33. Welfare Slaughter Late Detection FMD Outbreak Costs for Quarantined Uninfected Large Feedlots 
Costs 
(Thousand US $) 
January February March April May June July August September October November December 
Surveillance             
Minimum 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Maximum 2,010 2,010 2,010 2,010 2,010 2,010 2,010 2,010 2,010 2,010 2,010 2,010 
Average 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 
Appraisal             
Minimum 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Maximum 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
Average 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Euthanasia             
Minimum 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 
Maximum 13,180 13,180 13,180 13,180 13,180 13,180 13,180 13,180 13,180 13,180 13,180 13,180 
Average 2,637 2,637 2,637 2,637 2,637 2,637 2,637 2,637 2,637 2,637 2,637 2,637 
Disposal             
Minimum 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 
Maximum 8,172 8,172 8,172 8,172 8,172 8,172 8,172 8,172 8,172 8,172 8,172 8,172 
Average 1,635 1,635 1,635 1,635 1,635 1,635 1,635 1,635 1,635 1,635 1,635 1,635 
C&D             
Minimum 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 
Maximum 5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 
Average 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 
Indemnity Payments            
Minimum 5,816 6,136 5,786 5,841 6,000 6,030 6,163 6,187 6,073 6,180 6,234 6,116 
Maximum 239,558 252,715 238,328 240,563 247,143 248,373 253,824 254,834 250,122 254,538 256,744 251,912 
Average 47,929 50,561 47,683 48,130 49,446 49,692 50,783 50,985 50,042 50,926 51,367 50,400 
Total             
Minimum 6,522 6,841 6,492 6,546 6,706 6,736 6,868 6,893 6,778 6,886 6,939 6,822 
Maximum 268,608 281,766 267,379 269,613 276,193 277,424 282,874 283,884 279,172 283,588 285,795 280,963 
Average 53,741 56,373 53,495 53,942 55,259 55,505 56,595 56,797 55,855 56,738 57,180 56,213 
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Table 34. Welfare Slaughter Regular Surveillance FMD Outbreak Costs for Quarantined Uninfected Large Feedlots 
Costs 
(Thousand US $) 
January February March April May June July August September October November December 
Surveillance             
Minimum 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Maximum 1,662 1,662 1,662 1,662 1,662 1,662 1,662 1,662 1,662 1,662 1,662 1,662 
Average 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 
Appraisal             
Minimum 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Maximum 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
Average 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Euthanasia             
Minimum 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 
Maximum 10,892 10,892 10,892 10,892 10,892 10,892 10,892 10,892 10,892 10,892 10,892 10,892 
Average 2,227 2,227 2,227 2,227 2,227 2,227 2,227 2,227 2,227 2,227 2,227 2,227 
Disposal             
Minimum 211 211 211 211 211 211 211 211 211 211 211 211 
Maximum 6,753 6,753 6,753 6,753 6,753 6,753 6,753 6,753 6,753 6,753 6,753 6,753 
Average 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 
C&D             
Minimum 143 143 143 143 143 143 143 143 143 143 143 143 
Maximum 4,575 4,575 4,575 4,575 4,575 4,575 4,575 4,575 4,575 4,575 4,575 4,575 
Average 935 935 935 935 935 935 935 935 935 935 935 935 
Indemnity Payments            
Minimum 6,180 6,519 6,148 6,206 6,375 6,407 6,548 6,574 6,452 6,566 6,623 6,498 
Maximum 197,972 208,845 196,955 198,802 204,240 205,257 209,761 210,596 206,702 210,351 212,175 208,181 
Average 40,471 42,694 40,264 40,641 41,753 41,961 42,882 43,052 42,256 43,002 43,375 42,559 
Total             
Minimum 6,930 7,269 6,898 6,956 7,125 7,157 7,298 7,324 7,202 7,316 7,373 7,248 
Maximum 221,979 232,853 220,963 222,810 228,247 229,264 233,769 234,604 230,709 234,359 236,182 232,189 
Average 45,380 47,602 45,172 45,549 46,661 46,869 47,790 47,960 47,164 47,910 48,283 47,467 
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Table 35. Welfare Slaughter Enhanced Surveillance FMD Outbreak Costs for Quarantined Uninfected Large Feedlots 
Costs 
(Thousand US $) 
January February March April May June July August September October November December 
Surveillance             
Minimum 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Maximum 1,614 1,614 1,614 1,614 1,614 1,614 1,614 1,614 1,614 1,614 1,614 1,614 
Average 362 362 362 362 362 362 362 362 362 362 362 362 
Appraisal             
Minimum 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Maximum 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 
Average 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Euthanasia             
Minimum 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 
Maximum 10,580 10,580 10,580 10,580 10,580 10,580 10,580 10,580 10,580 10,580 10,580 10,580 
Average 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373 
Disposal             
Minimum 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 
Maximum 6,560 6,560 6,560 6,560 6,560 6,560 6,560 6,560 6,560 6,560 6,560 6,560 
Average 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,471 
C&D             
Minimum 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
Maximum 4,444 4,444 4,444 4,444 4,444 4,444 4,444 4,444 4,444 4,444 4,444 4,444 
Average 997 997 997 997 997 997 997 997 997 997 997 997 
Indemnity Payments            
Minimum 6,543 6,903 6,510 6,571 6,750 6,784 6,933 6,961 6,832 6,952 7,013 6,881 
Maximum 192,301 202,862 191,314 193,107 198,389 199,377 203,752 204,563 200,781 204,326 206,097 202,218 
Average 43,137 45,507 42,916 43,318 44,503 44,725 45,706 45,888 45,040 45,835 46,232 45,362 
Total             
Minimum 7,337 7,697 7,304 7,365 7,544 7,578 7,727 7,754 7,626 7,746 7,807 7,675 
Maximum 215,621 226,182 214,634 216,427 221,709 222,697 227,072 227,883 224,101 227,645 229,417 225,538 
Average 48,369 50,738 48,147 48,550 49,735 49,956 50,938 51,120 50,271 51,066 51,464 50,594 
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5.4.2 Seasonal Indemnity Payments 
For the welfare slaughter strategy, cost differences between initial outbreak months were 
solely driven on varying indemnity payment amounts for placements, cattle on feed, and 
marketings.  Placements were categorized as cattle that entered the feedlot right before 
the FMD outbreak occurred.  Cattle on feed were categorized as cattle that entered the 
feedlot previous to the new placements and won’t reach market weights within the next 
month, while marketings were cattle that would reach market weight and be harvested 
within the next month.  Placements were indemnified based on the full value before the 
outbreak occurred for the weighted steer and heifer incoming weight.  Marketings were 
indemnified based on the full value before the outbreak occurred for the weighted steer 
and heifer final weight and cattle on feed were assumed to be indemnified based on the 
average between the weighted incoming weights and final weights for steer and heifer.  
If this was not the case this would be reflective of the producer loss due to the movement 
restriction.     
 
During each month the majority of the herd was classified as cattle on feed, so it’s not 
surprising that indemnity payments for cattle on feed were the most expensive cost 
component.  Depending on the mitigation tactic, indemnity payments for cattle on feed 
ranged from $18.9 million, for outbreaks initiated in September, to $39.8 million, for 
outbreaks initiated in February.  Indemnity payments for marketing were the second 
most expensive cost component overall for each initial outbreak month, expect for 
September initiated outbreaks.  Average cost of indemnity payments for marketings 
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ranged from $6 million, for October initiated outbreaks, to $15.73 million, for outbreaks 
that began in July.  Indemnity payments for placements were the third largest cost 
component of the welfare slaughter strategy for all initial outbreak months, except for 
February and September initiated outbreaks.  There were no placements in the Texas 
feedlot herd makeup for the month of February because of the nature of original data 
used to build the Texas feedlot herd makeup, therefore, indemnity payments for 
placements for February initiated outbreaks were nonexistence.  For September initiated 
outbreaks indemnity payments for placements were the second most expensive cost 
component; this happened because the original data used to build the Texas feedlot herd 
makeup had two placement lots arriving in September so the percentage of placements in 
September was unusually high.  Average cost of indemnity payments for placements 
ranged from $0, for February initiated outbreaks, to $10.6 million, for September 
initiated outbreaks.  Tables 36-39 summarize the minimum, maximum, and average 
indemnity payments amounts for each mitigation tactic and initial outbreak month. 
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Table 36. Welfare Slaughter Early Detection Indemnity Payment Costs for Quarantined Uninfected Large Feedlots 
Cost  
(Thousand 
US $) 
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Placement Indemnity           
Minimum 1,010 0 1,101 878 833 721 1,077 1,179 2,042 961 1,024 1,114 
Maximum 22,046 0 24,016 19,157 18,166 15,735 23,504 25,719 44,549 20,971 22,337 24,306 
Average 5,219 0 5,686 4,535 4,301 3,725 5,564 6,089 10,546 4,965 5,288 5,754 
Cattle on Feed Indemnity           
Minimum 4,684 5,729 4,302 4,497 4,350 4,247 3,974 4,251 3,661 5,213 4,911 4,761 
Maximum 102,202 125,003 93,882 98,127 94,929 92,667 86,725 92,766 79,878 113,751 107,164 103,885 
Average 24,195 29,593 22,226 23,231 22,474 21,938 20,531 21,961 18,910 26,930 25,370 24,594 
Marketings Indemnity           
Minimum 1,213 1,558 1,468 1,561 1,943 2,193 2,267 1,917 1,509 1,165 1,468 1,388 
Maximum 26,467 33,989 32,042 34,063 42,390 47,858 49,460 41,841 32,934 25,416 32,027 30,296 
Average 6,266 8,047 7,586 8,064 10,036 11,330 11,709 9,905 7,797 6,017 7,582 7,172 
Indemnity Total            
Minimum 6,907 7,286 6,871 6,936 7,126 7,161 7,318 7,347 7,211 7,339 7,402 7,263 
Maximum 150,714 158,992 149,941 151,347 155,486 156,260 159,690 160,325 157,360 160,139 161,527 158,487 
Average 35,680 37,640 35,497 35,830 36,810 36,993 37,805 37,956 37,254 37,911 38,240 37,520 
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Table 37. Welfare Slaughter Late Detection Indemnity Payment Costs for Quarantined Uninfected Large Feedlots 
Cost  
(Thousand 
US $) 
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Placement Indemnity           
Minimum 851 0 927 739 701 607 907 993 1,719 809 862 938 
Maximum 35,041 0 38,173 30,450 28,875 25,010 37,360 40,880 70,809 33,334 35,504 38,634 
Average 7,011 0 7,637 6,092 5,777 5,004 7,475 8,179 14,167 6,669 7,103 7,730 
Cattle on Feed Indemnity           
Minimum 3,944 4,824 3,623 3,787 3,663 3,576 3,347 3,580 3,083 4,390 4,136 4,009 
Maximum 162,448 198,690 149,224 155,971 150,889 147,293 137,848 147,449 126,965 180,805 170,335 165,123 
Average 32,501 39,752 29,855 31,205 30,188 29,469 27,579 29,500 25,402 36,174 34,079 33,036 
Marketings Indemnity           
Minimum 1,021 1,312 1,237 1,315 1,636 1,847 1,909 1,615 1,271 981 1,236 1,169 
Maximum 42,069 54,026 50,931 54,142 67,379 76,070 78,616 66,505 52,348 40,399 50,906 48,155 
Average 8,417 10,809 10,190 10,832 13,481 15,219 15,729 13,306 10,473 8,083 10,185 9,634 
Indemnity Total            
Minimum 5,816 6,136 5,786 5,841 6,000 6,030 6,163 6,187 6,073 6,180 6,234 6,116 
Maximum 239,558 252,715 238,328 240,563 247,143 248,373 253,824 254,834 250,122 254,538 256,744 251,912 
Average 47,929 50,561 47,683 48,130 49,446 49,692 50,783 50,985 50,042 50,926 51,367 50,400 
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Table 38. Welfare Slaughter Regular Surveillance Indemnity Payment Costs for Quarantined Uninfected Large Feedlots 
Cost  
(Thousand 
US $) 
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Placement Indemnity           
Minimum 904 0 985 786 745 645 964 1,055 1,827 860 916 997 
Maximum 28,958 0 31,546 25,164 23,863 20,669 30,874 33,783 58,517 27,547 29,341 31,928 
Average 5,920 0 6,449 5,144 4,878 4,225 6,312 6,906 11,963 5,631 5,998 6,527 
Cattle on Feed Indemnity           
Minimum 4,191 5,126 3,849 4,024 3,892 3,800 3,556 3,804 3,275 4,664 4,394 4,260 
Maximum 134,248 164,198 123,320 128,895 124,695 121,723 113,918 121,853 104,924 149,418 140,765 136,458 
Average 27,444 33,567 25,210 26,350 25,491 24,884 23,288 24,910 21,450 30,546 28,777 27,896 
Marketings Indemnity           
Minimum 1,085 1,394 1,314 1,397 1,738 1,962 2,028 1,716 1,350 1,042 1,313 1,242 
Maximum 34,766 44,647 42,089 44,743 55,682 62,865 64,969 54,960 43,260 33,386 42,069 39,796 
Average 7,107 9,127 8,604 9,147 11,383 12,851 13,282 11,236 8,844 6,825 8,600 8,135 
Indemnity Total            
Minimum 6,180 6,519 6,148 6,206 6,375 6,407 6,548 6,574 6,452 6,566 6,623 6,498 
Maximum 197,972 208,845 196,955 198,802 204,240 205,257 209,761 210,596 206,702 210,351 212,175 208,181 
Average 40,471 42,694 40,264 40,641 41,753 41,961 42,882 43,052 42,256 43,002 43,375 42,559 
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Table 39. Welfare Slaughter Enhanced Surveillance Indemnity Payment Costs for Quarantined Uninfected Large Feedlots 
Cost  
(Thousand 
US $) 
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Placement Indemnity           
Minimum 957 0 1,043 832 789 683 1,020 1,117 1,934 910 970 1,055 
Maximum 28,129 0 30,643 24,443 23,179 20,077 29,990 32,815 56,841 26,758 28,500 31,013 
Average 6,310 0 6,874 5,483 5,200 4,504 6,727 7,361 12,751 6,002 6,393 6,957 
Cattle on Feed Indemnity           
Minimum 4,437 5,427 4,076 4,260 4,121 4,023 3,765 4,027 3,468 4,939 4,653 4,510 
Maximum 130,402 159,495 119,787 125,202 121,123 118,236 110,655 118,362 101,919 145,138 136,733 132,549 
Average 29,252 35,778 26,871 28,086 27,171 26,523 24,822 26,551 22,863 32,558 30,672 29,734 
Marketings Indemnity           
Minimum 1,149 1,476 1,391 1,479 1,840 2,078 2,147 1,817 1,430 1,103 1,390 1,315 
Maximum 33,770 43,368 40,884 43,462 54,087 61,064 63,108 53,386 42,021 32,429 40,864 38,656 
Average 7,575 9,728 9,171 9,749 12,133 13,698 14,157 11,976 9,426 7,275 9,167 8,671 
Indemnity Total            
Minimum 6,543 6,903 6,510 6,571 6,750 6,784 6,933 6,961 6,832 6,952 7,013 6,881 
Maximum 192,301 202,862 191,314 193,107 198,389 199,377 203,752 204,563 200,781 204,326 206,097 202,218 
Average 43,137 45,507 42,916 43,318 44,503 44,725 45,706 45,888 45,040 45,835 46,232 45,362 
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6. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
6.1 Summary 
This study investigated the costs and benefits of movement policies associated with large 
feedlots that fall within quarantine zones during a FMD outbreak. Specifically it 
examined welfare slaughter issues that could arise due to movement restrictions.  Two 
alternatives were investigated: one where the movement restrictions held and animals 
were slaughtered because of feed insufficiencies or space constraints and the other where 
feed was able to move in and finished animals out but at higher costs, plus the finished 
animals were assumed to go into cooked or canned meat uses at a 50% price discount.  
The results show that regardless of when a FMD outbreak occurred, using an 
unrestricted feed strategy was more cost effective than using a welfare slaughter 
strategy.  Intuitively, this implies that, if an effective truck disinfection regime can be put 
in place, it is more worthwhile to feed animals out and use the meat. Meaning, policies 
to provide feed to confined feeding operations and planning for moving meat to cooked 
and canned meat markets may be warranted as a part of preparedness planning.  
 
These results were consistent with the results found in Hagerman and McCarl (2009), 
where movement restriction policies that allowed feed to be brought onto California 
dairy premises located within the quarantine zone were less expensive than movement 
restriction policies that didn’t allow feed to be brought in.   
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For the unrestricted feed strategy the overall average total cost for all initial outbreaks 
months and mitigation tactics averaged $22.6 million, while, the overall total cost for the 
welfare slaughter strategy averaged $48.5 million  The average total cost difference 
between the unrestricted feed strategy and the welfare slaughter strategy ranged from 
$16.8 million to $36.3 million, a percent difference ranging from 60 percent to 94 
percent, depending on the mitigation tactic and initial outbreak month.   
 
The timing of when an outbreak occurred had an impact on the overall cost because of 
the monthly feedlot cattle weight mixture and seasonal cost components, such as the 
market value of cattle and feed costs.  For the unrestricted feed strategy, outbreaks that 
began in October were the least expensive on average.  This was mainly due to the fact 
the October initiated outbreaks affected the marketing of the least number of cattle over 
the duration of the quarantine yielding the lowest indemnity payment amounts and 
associated marketing costs across all monthly outbreaks.  Outbreaks that began in May 
were the most expensive because of the highest annual amount of marketings and in turn 
the highest indemnity payments and marketing costs.  For the welfare slaughter strategy, 
March initiated outbreaks were the least costly on average, while outbreaks that began in 
November were the most expensive.  In the welfare slaughter strategy indemnity 
payments weren’t dominated by anyone herd segment type.  Neither March nor 
November were initial outbreak months with minimum or maximum indemnity 
payments for placements, cattle on feed, or marketings.  This suggests that the entire 
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herd makeup must be examined to estimate indemnity payments for welfare slaughter 
strategies.  
 
Finally it is worthwhile mentioning that under both scenarios there were substantial 
losses arising to the uninfected premises within the quarantine zone.  But current US 
policy does not indicate that there would be indemnity payments for such parties.  
Consequently one other policy recommendation is that planners consider adding such 
payments to the suggested disease response policy.  
 
6.2 Limitations 
There are several limitations to this research that merit discussion.  First, the 
AUSSPREAD model results used did not reflect the risk of greater disease spread 
probabilities associated with the feed in and animals out strategy and adding this might 
be in order plus the increased or decreased risk of disease spread was not considered or 
captured in the cost.  Second the feedlot cattle weight mixture wasn’t built using Texas 
feedlot data; the only data available was from Kansas feedlots, so the data was adjusted 
using the average quarterly Texas steer to heifer ratio for cattle on feed.  Third, the total 
cost estimates should be considered conservative because no resource constraints were 
considered.  The movement strategies, especially the welfare slaughter strategy, may 
require some of the same resources required by the disease eradication efforts; 
competing for resources needed for the eradication effort could add time to the overall 
quarantine length or additional costs.  Fourth, portions of the epidemiological results 
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from the AUSSPREAD model didn’t match the findings of the High Plains Study (Ward 
et al. 2009).  For example, the previous study found that early detection significantly 
reduced the quarantine length, which was not the case in this study; early detection 
quarantines had the longest minimum and average quarantine length of the mitigation 
tactics examined.  This could have possibly happened because this study focused on a 
narrow portion of the epidemiological results, four scenarios and only quarantined, 
uninfected large feedlots; whereas, the High Plains Study included all epidemiological 
results for the thirteen premises types and 64 scenarios.  However, early detection did 
reduce the average and maximum number of head quarantined compared to the other 
mitigation tactics, which matched the results of the High Plains Study (Ward et al. 
2009).  Fifth, the AUSSPREAD results did not show variation in the number of 
surveillance visits between mitigations tactics; especially regular surveillance tactics 
verses enhanced surveillance tactics.  In future FMD cost research conducted using the 
AUSSPREAD model the underlying assumption that control surveillance visits should 
be adjusted so that the number of visits each uninfected premises receives varies. 
 
6.3 Application and Extension of Research 
Although the application of this research pertained to preventing animal welfare issues 
on uninfected, quarantined large feedlots in the THPR, the methodology developed and 
the results of this study potentially has other uses and broader implications for animal 
disease outbreak emergency and contingency planning.  The timing of when an outbreak 
occurs affects the costs associated with mitigating the disease because herd mixtures, 
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input prices, and output prices vary depending on the time of year.  Previous animal 
disease outbreak studies have failed to take into account the seasonal affects of costs and 
herd mixture.  Herd mixtures fluctuate throughout the year based on producers’ 
expectations and biological factors.  Understanding the seasonal fluctuations of herd 
mixtures is a step that can be taken to better inform policy makers of disease 
implications for multiple disease threats, not just FMD.  The timing of an outbreak could 
impact the way policy makers choose to mitigate a disease outbreak. 
 
In addition, animal welfare issues such as feed shortages could arise because of 
movement restrictions, especially in areas of concentrated livestock production.  This 
work could be extended to examine other possible movement strategies or combinations 
of strategies that could minimize costs associated with movement restrictions.  In 
addition, developing seasonal herd mixtures for the other THPR herd types would allow 
for a more thorough cost accounting of animal welfare strategies in the region.  This 
study assumed that feedlots operate at full capacity throughout the year, but varying 
feedlot populations throughout the year would be another logical extension.  Also, 
resource constraints could be modeled and integrated into the movement strategies to see 
how they would affect cost.  Finally, the framework developed in this study could be 
applied to other livestock production areas outside of the THPR.  Overall, this research 
serves as a foundation for future studies that examine costs of disease outbreaks based 
on when they occur.     
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6.4 Conclusion 
During an FMD outbreak mitigating animal welfare issues on uninfected, quarantined 
large feedlots will be costly, just how costly will partially be dependent on when the 
outbreak occurs.   The results show that regardless of when a FMD outbreak occurred, 
using an unrestricted feed strategy was more cost effective than using a welfare slaughter 
strategy in preventing animal welfare issues on uninfected quarantined large feedlots.  
Despite its shortcomings, the information generated by this study is of potential value to 
policy makers showing them the costs associated with mitigating animal welfare issues 
on quarantined, uninfected feedlots.  The results suggest that policy makers should 
strongly consider creating movement policies that address feed supply and finished 
animal movement for facilities in long standing quarantine zones; as such policies 
appear to reduce outbreak related costs for stakeholders and the U.S. government.  
Indemnity policies for uninfected herds in the quarantine zone also merit consideration. 
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